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Intellectual Property and Antitrust: A
Comparison of Evolution in the European
Union and United States
By SARA M. BIGGERS,* RICHARD A. MANN** AND BARRY S.
ROBERTS***
I. Introduction
A. Technology, Innovation and Globalization: The Changing
Marketplace
Unquestionably, technological innovation and the transfer of
resulting intellectual property rights have become central to the
economies of the United States and the European Union (EU). As
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Chairman Robert Pitofsky noted,
"International joint ventures and strategic alliances are almost as
common today as interstate alliances were 50 years ago.' Just as
evident is the fact that, increasingly, the chain from intellectual
property owner to producer to distributor to consumer stretches, at
least once, across the Atlantic. Consequently, transactions involving
the transfer and use of technology are more likely than ever to raise
antitrust issues and may involve antitrust enforcement agencies and
judicial bodies in both Europe and the United States.
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Carolina at Chapel Hill; J.D. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; LL.M.
McGeorge School of Law.
** Professor of Business Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; B.S.
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; J.D. Yale Law School.
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1. Robert Pitofsky, Chairman Federal Trade Commission, Address at the
Antitrust 1996 Conference, Business Development Association, Inc., Washington,
D.C. (Mar. 4,1996), available at <http:lwv.ft.gov/speecheqJ96spcech.htm>.
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FTC Commissioner Roscoe Starek recently reiterated this
important point, asserting that:
[a]ntitrust is becoming increasingly important to American firms
because they are engaging in more and more international
transactions. A firm must be carefully attuned not only to the
antitrust laws of the United States but also to the competition
policies and antitrust enforcement regimes of the other nations in
which it operates.2
The EU's European Commission is likewise aware that
competition policy must now accommodate the fact that "[t]he ever-
accelerating pace of technical progress and the development of more
efficient and less costly means of transport enable firms to operate in
markets to which they previously had access only with difficulty," and
that, reciprocally, means firms outside the EU can penetrate the EU
marketplace with less difficulty than ever before.
B. The Uncertainty of Transition
Changing market dynamics resulting from innovation and
globalization also impact antitrust enforcement. For antitrust
institutions in both the EU and the United States, the past few years
have been notable as a period of acculturation in response to a variety
of factors. These include market and technology dynamics as well as
external and domestic political, private sector and academic pressure,
to the extent that some question whether an "antitrust revolution" is
afoot.4  While developments in some economic sectors are
2. Commissioner Roscoe B. Starek, III, International Cooperation in Antitrust
Enforcement, Address at the Illinois State Bar Association International Trade
Program (May 10, 1996), available at <http:llwww.ftc.gov/speeches/starek/
illbar.htm>.
3. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, XXIVTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1994 27
(1995) [hereinafter XXIVTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1994].
4. See, e.g., Howard P. Marvel, Antitrust Policy and the Republican Congress:
Vertical Integration and Vertical Restraints, ANTITRUST BULL., Spring 1996, at 15, 18-
21 (examining the Republican political "upheaval" of 1994-95 in Congress in
conjunction with a "revolution" in economic theory as the settin; stage for an
antitrust "turnaround"). In explaining the impetus for holding groundbreaking
public hearings and the official staff report that resulted, the FTC described the
changing circumstances faced by antitrust agencies:
Forces of globalization and innovation that have been rippling through our
economy for more than 200 years are now ripping up the established terrain
of many economic sectors. Whether driven by improvements in computers,
biotechnology, communications or other technologies, tumbling
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tantamount to a revolution (e.g. biotechnology, computers and
telecommunications), overall the changes occurring at the antitrust-
intellectual property nexus are characterized more properly as
evolutionary rather than revolutionary. Nevertheless, such a period
of transition is inevitably overshadowed by uncertainty, especially on
the part of those that must forecast judicial or administrative
implementation of antitrust policy and plan their business conduct
accordingly. Indeed, one commentator noted that "the private
sector's concern over the increasing number of cases where
enforcement officials 'get the facts wrong' or 'misapply the law in a
mischievous way,"' and that "the private sector simply 'rolls over' and
accepts the decrees believing that there is 'no way that a company can
litigate against the government and win."'"
The introduction of the Hyde Bill (H.R. 2674) in November 1995
and again in 1997 further reflects this kind of antitrust anxiety.' The
transportation costs, falling regulatory barriers or freer domestic and
international capital markets, increasing globalization and rapid innovation
are profoundly altering the marketplace. These changes create new
possibilities and raise new problems for consumers, businesses, and
government agencies. It is in everyone's interest that government
understands these developments in order to make sure that the marketplace
continues to work competitively for businesses and consumers.
Fed. Trade Comm'n Staff, Anticipating the 21st Century." Competition Policy in the
New Hi-Tech, Global Marketplace (vol. 1) 11 (last modified May 1996)
<http'lwww.ftc.gov/opplglobal.htm> [hereinafter FTC Staff Report]; see also FTC
Staff Proposes Reforms-for Agency's Competition Policy, 70 Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) 645 (June 6, 1996) (summarizing salient suggestions in the FTC Staff
Report). -
5. Feds Won't Adjust Enforcement Policies to Accommodate Private Litigation
Costs, 70 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 369 (Apr. 4, 1996) [hereinafter Feds
Won't Adjust Enforcement Policies].
6. H.R. 401, 105th Cong. (1997) (this bill is similar, but not exactly the same as
the 1995 bill); H.R. 2674, 104th Cong. (1995). Introduced by Chairman of the House
Judiciary Committee, Henry J. Hyde (R-1ll.), the Hyde Bill, also known as the
"Intellectual Property Antitrust Protection Act of 1997," reflects the unalleviated
concern of the private sector regarding the position of antitrust enforcement agencies
with respect to intellectual property issues:
Sec. 2. Prohibition of Market Power Presumption
In any action in which the conduct of an owner, licensor, licensee, or
other holder of an intellectual property right is alleged to be in violation
of the antitrust laws in connection with the marketing or distribution of
a product or service protected by such a right, such right shall not be
presumed to define a market, to establish market power (including
economic power and product uniqueness or distinctiveness), or to
establish monopoly power.
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Hyde Bill seeks to legislatively bar courts from presuming market
power from the existence of intellectual property rights. Even though
section 2.2 of the 1995 Department of Justice (DOJ) and FTC
(collectively the Agencies) Intellectual Property Guidelines squarely
maintain that antitrust enforcement agencies will not presume market
power merely from the existence of intellectual property rights,
private sector confidence in this area is still low.7 Officials from the
DOJ and Commerce Department publicly announced that they find
the Hyde Bill redundant and therefore unnecessary although they
completely agree with its spirit. Yet, four out of five industry
panelists strongly support the bill and believe it would add sorely
needed predictability to the licensing process."
Similarly, on March 29, 1996, the German government's proposal
for the creation of a competition agency separate and distinct from
the European Commission manifested the insecurity felt within the
EU by industry as well as by some national competition authorities
regarding antitrust issues.9  The proposal's somewhat radical
argument that "decisions in individual competition cases should not
be a task for a politically-oriented decision-making body" further
illustrated both private and public unease toward current antitrust
revision." Proclamations by official enforcement agencies of
intentions to redouble enforcement efforts exacerbated ihis "antitrust
transition anxiety" on both sides of the Atlantic. The announcement
Id. (the 1995 Bill had an identical provision).
7. U.S. Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Antitrust
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property-1995, 4 Trade R eg. Rep. (CCH)
13,132 (Apr. 11, 1995) [hereinafter the IP Guidelines]. See infra notes 160-62 and
accompanying text.
8. House Committee Holds Hearings on Antitrust/Intellectual Property Bill, 70
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 525 (May 16, 1996) ("Without certainty in this
area of the law,... conflicting judicial opinions will continue to discourage,
complicate, and delay the enforceability of intellectual property rights." Thus, "some
in the business community may be reluctant to use their intellectual properties in
ways that could maximize their return on investments."). According to then DOJ
Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General Joel Klein, "the virtual unanimity of
scholars on this point, the analysis contained in the DOJ/FTC Intellectual Property
Guidelines, 'and the inexorable development and maturation of the court decisions in
this area of antitrust law' raises the question as to whether this bill is really
necessary." Id.
9. See Karl Van Miert, The Proposal for a European Competition Agency, EC
COMPETITION POL'Y NEWSL., Summer 1996, at 1.
10. Id. at 3.
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by FTC Commissioner Christine Varney that, with respect to vertical
licensing restraints, both price and non-price, the FTC "now intends
to enforce the law in this area""1 serves as one such example.
C. Decentralization of Antitrust Enforcement Creates Uncertainty
The movement toward "decentralization" of antitrust
enforcement represents yet another uncertainty-causing trend in
antitrust policy in the EU and the United States. An express
affirmative policy of the European Commission exists to "encourag[e]
national enforcement of Community competition law.""2  The
Commission therefore anticipates that the EU Member States' courts
and competition authorities will play an increasingly important role
"in ensuring unrestricted and fair competition in the Union."" To
this effect the Commission issued an official notice on cooperation
between national courts and the Commission in applying articles 85
and 86 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community." Within
the United States, the past few years witnessed a similar migration of
11. Verticals Enforcement Agenda Includes RPM, Nonprice Rcstraints, 'arney
Says, 70 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 49 (Jan. 25, 1996). See infra note 25t)
and accompanying text. See also Feds Won't Adjust Enforcement Policies, supra note
5, at 369. FTC Chairman Robert Pitofsky e.xplains that "the FTC of the 1990s must
enforce the law vigorously with methods of enforcement that parallel the changes in
technology and the global market." Id.; see EUROPEAN COMMISSION, VXVTH
REPORT ON COMPETION POLICY 1995 16-17,23 (1995) [hereinafter,1XVmH REORTr
ON COMPETMON POLICY 1995] (stressing the need for the Commission to vigilantly
enforce the competition rules).
12. XXVTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1995, supra note 11, at 43; see also
id. at 19 (In 1995 "[tlhe Commission therefore continued to encourage the
decentralized application of Community competition rules" with the aim of
"establish[ing] effective cooperation between the national courts, competition
authorities, and itself."); Karl Van Miert. Address at the Third European-Japan
Competition Policy Seminar (Nov. 22, 1995) (discussing the logistical need to expand
competition review to national authorities in a coherent fashion and the fact that over
half of the Member States have antitrust laws based on EU model).
13. XXVTH REPORT ON COMPETrrION POLICY 1995, supra note 11, at 44.
14. Notice on Cooperation Between National Courts and the Commission in
Applying Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty, 1993 O.J. (C 39) 6. In the XXth
Report on Competition Policy, the Commission indicated that work is well underway
on a new Notice on cooperation between the Commission and national antitrust
enforcement bodies to replace the one now in effect. The Commission cautioned,
however, that the decentralization process should be implemented gradually, in
conjunction with "a continuing effort on the part of the Commission to clarify and
simplify the rules of substance in order to enable the Member States to use the same
concepts when applying the Community competition rules." Id. at 19.
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
antitrust enforcement activity from federal agencies to local and state
authorities. Unlike the EU, however, this shift did not arise out of a
well-reasoned plan to improve and unify the application of federal
antitrust laws.15 Rather, the significant increase in state and local
antitrust activity is a usurpation of federal enforcement. An
ideological tenet of the Republican-controlled Congress to devolve
governmental functions to the states, in part, influenced this
increase.'
6
Professor Howard Marvel indicated that one "response to
changes in federal antitrust policy has been to energize the states to
take a more active role in enforcing vertical restraints rules."'" He
further opined that "the growth of state involvement in multistate
vertical restraint actions is clearly a response to the diminished
federal activity in this area."'8  Furthermore, the adoption of the
National Association of Attorneys General Vertical Restraints
Guidelines represents clear evidence of the new, assertive antitrust
posture of the states.9 These Guidelines push for a narrower, more
stringent enforcement of vertical restraints than their now-defunct
federal counterpart, the DOJ Vertical Restraints Guidelines."
Reallocation of antitrust enforcement roles from federal to state
entities can only erode the confidence of the private sector, which
already has "a perception of state bias," including the perception that
state agencies "institut[e] litigation simply to recover administrative
costs."
21
15. However, the federal antitrust enforcement agencies indicated their
cooperation and support of state enforcement efforts. See, e.g., Feds Won't Adjust
Enforcement Policies, supra note 5, at 369-70.
16. See, e.g., New York v. Reebok Int'l Ltd., D.C. S.N.Y., No. 95 Civ. 3143, Apr.
25, 1995; see also Jean Wegman Bums, Vertical Restraints, Efficiency, and the Real
World, 62 FORDHAM L. REv. 597 (1993) (describing trend in adoption of stringent
state measures in vertical relationships).
17. Marvel, supra note 4, at 15,30.
18. Id. at 31.
19. NAAG Resolution, Executive Summary and Summary of Contents on
Revisions to Vertical Restraints Guidelines, 68 Antitrust & Trade Rag. Rep. (BNA)
435 (Mar. 30,1995).
20. Department of Justice, Vertical Restraints Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 13,105 (Aug. 17,1993) (announcing the official withdrawal of the 1985 DOJ
Vertical Restraints Guidelines as of Aug. 10, 1993).
21. Feds Won't Adjust Enforcement Policies, supra note 5, at 369. As Professor
Howard Marvel succinctly stated, "If enforcement is indeed to be national in scope,
then it makes sense to place responsibility for that enforcement at the level of the
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D. The New Climate of EU-U.S. Antitrust Enforcement
Cooperation
The unprecedented level of international cooperation between
enforcement agencies, particularly those in the EU and the United
States constitutes one of the most noticeable aspects of evolving
antitrust policy. In a speech before the American Law Institute,
former Assistant Attorney General Anne K. Bingaman recently
indicated that "[b]ilateral relationships with foreign competition
authorities have resulted in a climate of trust that is blossoming now
into full fledged cooperative prosecution of antitrust cases."2 The
1995 DOJ and FTC Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for
International Operations? (International Operations Guidelines)
discussed infra also emphasize the importance of multiple levels of
international cooperation in antitrust enforcement. This cooperation
results in informal consultations, general understandings, bilateral
agreements and multilateral accords used to enhance effectiveness
and reduce political tensions."
The European Commission also champions an equally positive,
albeit more straightforward, position on the exigency of international
cooperation in antitrust enforcement. It maintains that such
collaboration is not only "inevitable" but is "clearly in the interests of
industry and consumers."' Moreover, at the behest of Karl Van
Miert, the commissioner responsible for competition, an independent
group of experts issued a report recommending that the Commission
prioritize the "deepening" of EU-U.S. bilateral antitrust enforcement
cooperation. 6 This in turn led to an official Communication from the
federal government." Marvel, supra note 4, at 31.
22. Bingaman Finds Climate of Trust in Prosecution of International Cases, 70
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 571 (May 23, 1996); see also Chairman Robert
Pitofsky, International Antitrust-An FTC Perspective, Address Before the
Fordliam Corporate Law Institute 22nd Annual Conference on International
Antitrust Law and Policy (Oct. 26, 1995), available at <http:Iiwwv.ftc.gov1
speeches/pitofsky/fdi95.htm> ("During the past year, EC and FTC staff consulted on
numerous matters, mostly mergers, but also policy and procedure changes.").
23. U.S. Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, Antitrust Enforcement
Guidelines for International Operations-1995, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) S 13,107
(197) [hereinafter International Operations Guidelines].
24. Id. §§ 2.9,2.91, 2.92.
25. XXVTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POUCY 1995, supra note 11, at 18.
26. Id. at 15; see Opinions & Comments: International Cooperation, EC
COMPETITON PoL'Y NEWSL, Summer 1996, at 19; see also Pitofsky, supra note 22, at
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
European Commission recommending the expansion of such
cooperation.'
1. The EU-U.S. Antitrust Cooperation Agreement
The "revival" of the EU-U.S. Antitrust Cooperation Agreement
of 19912 in April 1995 represented one important development in the
expansion of transatlantic antitrust collaboration. Due to procedural
uncertainties in the uncharted ground of bilateral antitrust
cooperation, in August 1994 the European Court of Justice ruled that
such an Agreement was only within the competency of the European
Council and not the Commission.' Accordingly, the European
Council approved the Agreement on April 10, 1995, at which time the
Council also approved "the text of a letter addressed to the United
States clarifying the European Community's interpretation of certain
6-7 (stating that the Experts' Report recommends that the EU enter into a "second
generation" enforcement agreement along the lines of the 1994 U.S. International
Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act).
27. XXVTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1995, supra note 11, at 18.
28. Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the
Commission of the European Communities Regarding the Application of Their
Competition Laws, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,504 (Sept. 23, 1991); USIEC
Agreement on Antitrust Cooperation and Coordination, 61 Antitrust & Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) 382-85 (Sept. 26, 1991); Decision of the Council and the Commission
Concerning the Conclusion of the Agreement Between the European Communities
and the Government of the United States of America Regarding the Application of
Their Competition Laws, 1995 O.J. (L 95) 45, corrected at 1995 O.1. (L 131) 38; see
also Commissioner Roscoe B. Starek, III, Address at "Antitrust 1996": A Conference
Presented by Business Development Assoc., Inc. in Washington, D.C (Sept. 29,
1995), available at <http:/www.ftc.gov/speeches/starek/starekda.htm> (discussing key
developments in procedural cooperation and convergence in transnational antitrust
issues).
29. For an explanation on the procedural history of the now-ratified EU-U.S.
Antitrust Cooperation Agreement of 1991, see XXIVT REPORT ON COMPETITION
POLICY 1994, supra note 3, at 202-03. Despite the European Court of Justice's
decision requiring action by the European Council, the Agreement remained in
effect pending the Council's decision:
Nonetheless, by virtue of the Vienna Convention (Article 46), an authority
which is not 'manifestly incompetent' to conclude an agreement binds the
State for which is acts. As the lack of competency on the Commission's part,
as determined by the Court, was not a defect which was of should have been
obvious to the contracting parties, the EU/US Agreement remains valid
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provisions of the Agreement." Article LX of the Agreement
recognizes that, under EU and U.S. law, business information
obtained by antitrust authorities during investigations remains
confidential and cannot be disclosed to outside agencies without the
express consent of the business. However, agency reaction regarding
the usefulness of the Agreement has been positive nonetheless. For
example, as FTC Commissioner Roscoe Starek affirmed:
Given these confidentiality restrictions, some have questioned
whether any useful cooperation is possible under the EU-US
Cooperation Agreement. Again, the answer is clearly 'yes.' The
notifications, provided for under the Agreement, alert us to each
other's interests in particular matters. And although we are
prohibited from discussing the confidential business information
obtained in our investigations, in appropriate instances we share
our views on matters such as jurisdiction, market definition,
competitive effects, and remedies. This has helped both sides
recognize any potential for conflict in enforcement.3
Likewise, the European Commission reports on the utility of the
Agreement:
Notifications from the United States to the EC under the
Agreement have continued regularly through the year with a total
of 35 altogether (21 from the Department of Justice and 14 from
the Federal Trade Commission), 21 of which were in merger cases.
30. XXVTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLIcY 1995, supra note 11, at 99. The
Commission's letter addresses two issues of paramount concern to firms and
enforcement agencies alike:
Firstly, information covered by Article 20 of Regulation 17 or by
equivalent provisions of other regulations in the field of competition
[compelled information disclosure to authorities] may not be communicated
by the Commission to the US antitrust authorities save with the express
agreement of the source concerned.
Secondly, each Party ensures the confidentiality of all information
provided in confidence by the other Party and will use all the legal means at
its disposal to oppose the disclosure of such information. The Commission,
after notifying the US competition authorities, will inform the Member
State(s) whose interests are affected of notifications sent to the Commission
by the US antitrust authorities and, after consulting them will also inform
the Member State(s) concerned of any cooperation or coordination of
enforcement activities. In the latter regard, however, the Commission will
respect a request by the US authority not to disclose the information which
they provided in cases where this is necessary to ensure confidentiality.
31. Starek, supra note 28, at 2.
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The notifications from the EC to the United States resumed after
10 April, following the short interruption due to uncertainty about
the legal position of the Agreement under Community law. The
EC notified the United States on 43 occasions in 1995, of which 30
involved merger cases.32
The recent Microsoft case3 serves as a noteworthy instance of
EU-U.S. antitrust collaboration. Both in the United States and the
EU, Microsoft's competitors lodged complaints about their licensing
restrictions, under which computer manufacturers had to pay
royalties on a per-machine basis regardless of whether Microsoft's
operating system software was actually installed. They argued these
restrictions foreclosed the market to competitors. In order to
promulgate a consistent, expedient conclusion to the dual
investigations, Microsoft consented to the exchange of information
between the European Commission and the DOJ and entered into
trilateral talks that resulted in consent decrees on identical terms,"
The Shell/Montedison polypropylene joint venture announced in
1994 s exemplified another case of coordinated international support
in investigation procedure. As FTC Commissioner Roscoe Starek
32. XXVTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1995, supra note 11, at 99.
33. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 56 F.3d 1448 (D.C. Cir. 1995), consent
decree issued, 1995 WL 505998 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 21, 1995); Proposed Final Judgment
and Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Microsoft, 59 Fed. Reg. 42,845,
1995-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 50,764 (1994); see also Marvel, supra note 4, at 36-40
(analyzing three separate antitrust investigations of Microsoft Corp.).
34. See XXIVTH ANNUAL REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1994, supra note 3,
at 365:
The undertaking obtained by the Commission provides that Microsoft will
not enter into license contracts with a duration of more than one year, will
not impose minimum commitments on licensees and will not use per
processor type licenses in future. Per system licenses will be allowed only if
licensees are clearly given the freedom to purchase non-Microsoft products
and to avoid payment of royalties in such cases. In addition, any provision of
such existing contracts which breach these provisions will not be enforced,
and licensees have an option to end such existing contracts. The
undertaking is for a period of six and a half years.
Id. (summarizing procedural history of Microsoft case within EU as well as EU-U.S.-
Microsoft interaction); see also Bingaman Finds Climate of Trust in Prosecution of
International Cases, supra note 22 (Microsoft "judged its own commercial interests as
best served by a single, world-wide set of licensing rules--derscoring the
importance to business of meaningful cooperation by international enforcement
agencies.").
35. Commission Decision 94/811/EC of 8 June 1994, Case IVIM.0269, 1994 O.J.
(L 332) 48; Montedison S.p.A. et al., 60 Fed. Reg. 31,469 (FTC 1995) (consent order).
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explained, "The FTC and the EC both took a global view of this
transaction, with their investigative staffs continuously sharing views
on market definition, competitive effects, and potential remedies.
FFC staff also responded to EC questions about U.S. law on
jurisdiction, parent/subsidiary relations, contract rights, and
intellectual property rights."?'
Not all commentators are as enthusiastic regarding this new era
of antitrust enforcement cooperation, recognizing the potential traps
of a dual enforcement approach of two similar, but not identical, legal
regimes:
This increased cooperation may be seen as either reducing pitfalls
or digging existing pitfalls deeper. The pitfalls have been dug
deeper if cooperation means that greater burdens of information
producing and advocacy may be imposed and inconsistent relief
may be sought; they are reduced to the extent that the authorities
may share work product, delegate responsibilities to one another,
avoid duplication, repetition, and cost; and at the end of the day (as
in Microsoft) seek to impose consistent relief. Yet, one should not
forget that even in Microsoft the negotiated relief was challenged
by private interests in the U.S. courts, producing delay, expense,
and uncertainty, if not any difference in ultimate outcome.'
2. The International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act
The passage of the International Antitrust Enforcement
Assistance Act (IAEAA) ' represented a second major development
on the cooperative front of international antitrust enforcement. The
IAEAA empowers the FTC and DOJ to conclude bilateral
agreements with antitrust agencies in other countries that permit,
under strictly delineated circumstances, the sharing of confidential
information. According to U.S. officials, three general principles set
the tone of the IAEAA. First, the IAEAA contains several
36. Starek, supra note 2, at 2-3. For an interesting and informative discourse
from differing perspectives in this case, see the panel discussion (Shell Oil counsel,
FTC and EU officials) in Mergers and Joint Ventures Roundtable, 1994 FORO, HAM,.
CORP. L. INsT. 165, 187.
37. James B. Kobak, Jr., Running the Gauntlet: Antitrust and Intellectual Property
Pitfalls on the Two Sides of the Atlantic, 64 ANTrRUsT LJ. 341,359 (1996).
38. International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994, Pub. L No. 103-
438, 108 Stat. 4597 (1994) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6212) [hereinafter IAEAA].
39. See, e.g., Starek, supra note 28, at 4; Starek, supra note 2, at 5-6; Bingaman
Finds Climate of Trust in Prosecution of International Cases, supra note 22.
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provisions specifically designed to protect the confidentiality of
competitively sensitive information (confidentiality)- Second,
foreign antitrust authorities, in general, must demonstrate the same
degree of good faith and responsiveness as shown by the United
States (reciprocity).4 Third, the IAEAA acknowledges that there
may be situations in which compliance with a request for information
harms the public interest."
A particularly striking aspect of the IAEAA is the grant of
authority to the DOJ and FTC to use their compulsory process
powers to obtain and transmit evidence to the requesting foreign
authority irrespective of whether the situation under investigation
constitutes a violation of U.S. law. 3 In addition, these agencies may
also transmit information gleaned from criminal grand jury
proceedings to foreign authorities.' Also, while information obtained
in the process of premerger notification filings may not be distributed
to foreign antitrust agencies, the DOJ and FTC may nonetheless
resort to their compulsory process tools to procure information in
merger cases that may then be shared 5
Not surprisingly, enthusiasm is running high among U.S. officials
with respect to the IAEAA and its potential advantages for more
effective antitrust enforcement. For example, evidence concerning
foreign cartel activity or other anticompetitive foreign conduct
adversely impacting the U.S. market often remains out of the reach of
U.S. authorities. While presently, most other countries have yet to
enact legislation authorizing the bilateral agreements envisaged by
the IAEAA, then-Assistant Attorney General Anne K. Bingaman
reported that "we are receiving a very positive response from some of
our major trading partners."" On the other hand, non-governmental
detractors have been quick to voice opposition to such collaborative
enforcement agreements. The International Chamber of Commerce
issued a statement in September 1995 maintaining that sharing
sensitive business information as entailed in such international
40. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6204, 6205,6207.
41. See 15 U.S.C. § 6210.
42. 15 U.S.C. § 6207.
43. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6202-03; see also Starek, supra note 28, at 4.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 6204; see also Starek, supra note 28, at 4.
45. 15 U.S.C. § 6204; see also Starek, supra note 28, at 4.
46. Bingaman Finds Climate of Trust in Prosecution of International Cases, supra
note 22.
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cooperative efforts would "endanger the confidentiality of corporate
information." 7  Indeed, now more than ever, companies face
tremendous pressure to innovate in order to achieve and preserve
market position. These firms understandably feel discomfited over
the widening circle of outsiders having access to valuable business
information. Nevertheless, the trend toward international
cooperation in competition enforcement seems likely to go forvard.
3. 1995 DOJ/FTC International Operations Guidelines
The issuance by the DOJ and FTC of revised guidelines relating
specifically to its international antitrust enforcement policies
represents a third noteworthy occurrence pertaining to international
antitrust enforcement cooperation. '  The 1995 International
Operations Guidelines serve to "provide antitrust guidance to
businesses engaged in international operations."" The Guidelines are
clearly an incomplete treatment of the general antitrust enforcement
scheme as to matters within U.S. jurisdiction. However, they do
provide useful insight into focal topics such as:
the Agencies' subject matter jurisdiction over conduct and entities
outside the United States and the considerations, issues, policies
and processes that govern their decision to exercise that jurisdiction
as well as comity, mutual assistance in international antitrust
enforcement, and the effects of foreign governmental involvement
on the antitrust liability of private entitiesP
Sections 2.1 through 2.842 provide an overview of core U.S.
antitrust legislation. This includes the Sherman Act," the Clayton
47. Starek, supra note 2, at 2 (citing International Chamber of Commerce (ICC),
press release, Competition Law. Business Concerns About Confidentiality of
Corporate Information (Sept. 26, 1995)); see Pitofsky, supra note 22, at 7. FTC
Chairman Robert Pitofsk-y reports that another concern of the ICC is "the additional
danger that information might be misinterpreted or misunderstood in the jurisdiction
to which it is transferred. Companies might well present information differently to
accommodate major divergences in competition law and policy in different
countries." Id. Pitofsky dismisses such concern as exaggerated and states that "[tihe
only 'danger' I see is that it would be more difficult for companies to make
inconsistent presentations to us and to the EC." Id.
48. International Operations Guidelines, supra note 23.
49. Id.§1.
50. Id.
51. Id. § 2.1.
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Act,'2 the Federal Trade Commission Act53 and the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act.' In addition, the International
Operations Guidelines cover other key legislation concerning
international commercial activity such as the National Cooperative
Research and Production Act, s the Webb-Pomerene Act 6 and the
Wilson Tariff Act," to list a few. Sections 2.9, 2.91 and 2.92 then
introduce the subject of international antitrust cooperation
agreements on different levels, including mutual legal assistance
treaties (MLATs), which permit bilateral criminal law enforcement
cooperation.5 8
Section 3, aptly entitled "Threshold International Enforcement
Issues," tackles the frequently controversial issue of U.S. jurisdiction
in the international context" by outlining the jurisdictional test for
both foreign import commerce and non-import commerce:
With respect to foreign import commerce, the Supreme Court has
recently stated in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. Californiao' that
'the Sherman Act applies to foreign conduct that was meant to
produce and did in fact produce some substantial effect in the
United States.' There has been no such authoritative rulyng on the
scope of the FTC Act, but both Acts apply to commerce 'with
foreign nations' and the Commission has held that terms used by
both Acts should be construed together." Second, with respect to
foreign commerce other than imports, the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvement Act of 1982 ('FTAIA')62 applies to foreign conduct
52. Id. § 2.2
53. Id. § 2.3.
54. Id. § 2.4.
55. Id. § 2.5.
56. Id. § 2.6.
57. Id. § 2.81.
58. Id. § 2.91. However, the International Operations Guidelines disclose that
"only the MLAT with Canada has been used to date to obtain assistance in antitrust
investigations." Id. (citation omitted).
59. Section 3.1 states unequivocally that the "reach of U.S. antitrust laws is not
limited, however, to conduct and transactions that occur within the boundaries of the
United States. Anticompetitive conduct that affects U.S. domestic or foreign
commerce may violate the U.S. antitrust laws regardless of where such conduct
occurs or of the nationality of the parties involved."
60. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 113 S. Ct. 2891, 2909 (1993).
61. In re Mass. Bd. of Registration for Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549, 609 (1988).
62. Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1988); Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. § 45(a)(3) (1988).
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that has a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on
U.S. commerce.&
Section 3.11 pragmatically reduces the jurisdictional test for
foreign imports to a question of "substantial effect," stating explicitly
that "[i]mports into the United States by definition affect the U.S.
domestic market directly, and will, therefore, almost invariably satisfy
the intent part of the Hartford Fire test. Whether they in fact produce
the requisite substantial effects will depend on the facts of each
case."" As regards non-import commerce, the "direct, substantial,
and reasonably foreseeable" standard of the FTAIA controls in such
situations as when "a cartel of foreign enterprises, or a foreign
monopolist, reaches the U.S. market through any mechanism that
goes beyond direct sales, such as the use of an unrelated intermediary,
as well as in cases in which foreign vertical restrictions or intellectual
property licensing arrangements have an anticompetitive effect on
U.S. commerce. '
The International Operations Guidelines summarize three
additional circumstances in which the United States will assert subject
matter jurisdiction. First, there are two types of export situations that
fall within the FTAIA jurisdictional test. If anticompetitive conduct,
regardless of where it occurs, restrains U.S. exports, meets the "direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable" standard of the FTAIA and
"U.S. courts can obtain jurisdiction over persons or corporations
engaged in such conduct," then antitrust enforcement action will be
taken. 6 Also, the Agencies may take action against U.S. exporters if
their conduct has a "direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable
effect on trade or commerce within the United States, or on import
trade or commerce."'  Second, the Agencies may assert their
authority when "the U.S. Government is a purchaser, or substantially
funds the purchase, of goods or services for consumption or use
abroad."6'  Finally, section 3.14 reaffirms the same principles of
agency jurisdiction in the merger context under section 7 of the
Clayton Act as would apply to Sherman Act cases.
63. International Operations Guidelines, supra note 23, § 3.1.
64. Id. § 3.11.
65. Id. § 3.121.
66. Id. § 3.122.
67. Id
68. Id. § 3.13.
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The principle of comity, described as "the recognition which one
nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or
judicial acts of another nation,"69 plays an imporlant role in
transnational enforcement of U.S. antitrust laws. In evaluating
"whether significant interests of any foreign sovereign would be
affected," section 3.2 outlines a non-exclusive list of eight factors
typifying considerations in the delicate balancing of respective
governmental interests.0 When confronted with a situat on requiring
comity analysis, the Agencies will first inquire as to what foreign laws
or policies may come into play. Increasingly, as more countries adopt
antitrust laws "compatible" with those of the United States, it may
turn out that there exists "no actual conflict between the antitrust
enforcement interests of the United States and the laws or policies of
a foreign sovereign."'" Moreover, as emphasized in the International
Operations Guidelines, "the Supreme Court made clear in Hartford
Fire that no conflict exists for purposes of an international comity
analysis in the courts if the person subject to regulation by two States
can comply with the laws of both."2
Section 3.2 also indicates that, when assessing whether to assert
jurisdiction to investigate or commence an action, the Agencies will
consider whether their enforcement objectives would be fulfilled by
foreign enforcement or even by less formal measures such as
consultation through diplomatic channels. In light of such thorough
deliberation, one may conclude that "[i]n cases where the United
States decides to prosecute an antitrust action, such a decision
represents a determination by the Executive Branch that the
69. Id. § 3.2 (citing the classic U.S. Supreme Court decision Hilton v. Guyot, 159
U.S. 113,164 (1895)).
70. Section 3.2 directs that "[in performing a comity analysis, the Agencies take
into account all relevant factors. Among others, these may include (1) the relevant
significance to the alleged violation of conduct within the United States, as compared
to conduct abroad; (2) the nationality of the persons involved in or affected by the
conduct; (3) the presence or absence of a purpose to affect U.S. consumers, markets,
or exporters; (4) the relative significance and foreseeability of the effects of the
conduct on the United States as compared to the effects abroad; (5) the existence of
reasonable expectations that would be furthered or defeated by the action; (6) the
degree of conflict with foreign law or articulated foreign economic policies; (7) the
extent to which the enforcement activities of another country with respect to the
same persons, including remedies resulting from those activities, may be affected; and
(8) the effectiveness of foreign enforcement as compared to U.S. enforcement action.
71. Id.
72. Id. (citation omitted).
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importance of antitrust enforcement [in that instance] outweighs any
relevant foreign policy concerns.""
The remainder of section 3 covers U.S. law and policy with
regard to quasi-diplomatic issues of public international law such as
foreign sovereign immunity.' foreign sovereign compulsion" and acts
of State.' The last section of the International Operations
Guidelines, section 4, provides summary information regarding the
personal jurisdiction of the Agencies,' investigatory practice relating
to foreign nations7 and special foreign commerce rules in connection
to mergers and acquisitions under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act."
I. Key Legislative and Policy Developments in the EU and the
United States
A. EU: The Framework for Competition
As discussed above, because so many high technology and
intellectual property licensing agreements will be subject to the
jurisdiction of both the EU and the United States, all parties
connected to such licenses must have at least a rudimentary grasp of
the overall antitrust policy behind these two legal regimes. While
there exists extensive overlap between EU and U.S. antitrust
enforcement issues, and the legal and administrative solutions thereby
derived, there are also fundamental differences between the EU and
the United States in substantive law, policy and underlying objectives.
For example, "under [EU] law there is the imperative of market
integration and a long history of jurisprudence applying that
imperative to the field of intellectual property rights that does not
exist under U.S. law." + Furthermore, while many scholars perceive a
73. i
74. Id. § 3.31.
75. Id. § 3.32.
76. Id.§ 3.33.
77. Id. § 4.1.
78. Id. § 4.2.
79. Id. § 4.22.
80. Sebastiano Guttuso, Technology Transfer Agreements Under EC Law?,, 1994
FORDHAM CoRp. L. INsrr. 227, 235. Mr. Guttuso summarizes the development of
the EU approach to technology licenses as follovs:
The goal of market unification is an imperative of the EC Treaty and that
goal has played a significant role in the jurisprudence concerning the free
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noteworthy similarity of core antitrust regulations between the EU's
articles 85 and 86 and sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, the later-
evolved EU regulatory scheme is "not just a conflation of U.S.
principles."'"
At the heart of EU competition law lies article 85, which subjects
all licensing and other agreements to a bifurcated analysis before
movement of goods (Articles 30-36 of the EC Treaty) and intellectual
property. This jurisprudence developed primarily in the 1970s and early to
mid-1980s has established that the specific subject matter of a patent is the
guarantee that the patentee shall have the exclusive right to be the first to
manufacture and put into free circulation the patented product. Given this
definition of the patent monopoly, it is incompatible with Article; 30-36 for a
patentee to assert its patent rights in one Member State to prevent the
importation and marketing there of patented products put on the market in
another Member State by or with its consent. In light of this jurisprudence,
it is not surprising that the Commission has also incorporated the same
approach in its application of Article 85(1) to patent and technology
licenses.
Id. at 237. James Kobak describes the pivotal difference to intellectual property
licensing policy created by the disparate attitudes toward market integration, stating
that "territorial restrictions and exclusive licenses that would segregate markets-
more or less presumptively lawful in the United States ever since the demise of the
Schwinn case and regarded with favor by the IP Guidelines-are problematic and
hedged with restrictions in the EU." Kobak, supra note 37, at 352. See also
Willajeane F. McLean, EEC-US View on Restrictive Clauses, in TIIE LAW AND
BUSINESS OF LICENSING 629 (1991); Helmuth R.B. Schr6ter, Antitrust Analysis Under
Article 85(1) and (3), 1988 FORDHAM CORP. L. INSTIT. 645; Curtis Brooks Cutter,
Note, Territorial Distribution and Patent Licensing in the European Community:
Towards a Rule of Reason, 20 STAN. J. INT'L L. 503 (1984). As. the European
Commission makes clear in its XXVth Report on Competition Policy 1995:
It is one of the most well-established principles of Community competition
law that producers are forbidden to divide the internal market by private
agreements and to maintain price differences by arranging anti-competitive
absolute territorial protection. However, such behavior continues to occur
on the market and, where it comes to light, one can expect severe action by
the Commission.
XXVTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1995, supra note 11, at 24.
81. Kobak, supra note 37, at 352. As viewed by Kobak, antitrust law in Europe,
especially regarding vertical licensing restrictions and alleged abuses of a dominant
position, has become increasingly restrictive and formalistic, while at the same time
"the U.S. approach has become much more flexible and, in general, more
permissive." Id. at 346, 352. Compare comments by FTC Chairman .Robert Pitofsky
regarding antitrust enforcement actions having both a European and American
counterpart, in which he found it most interesting that "the consistency of analysis
and conclusions that were reached by our respective [EC Commission and FTC] staff
members. Although there are procedural and substantive differences between our
laws, the market analysis brought to bear is quite similar." Pitofsky, supra note 22, at
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validity is confirmed. Under the U.S. approach, generally speaking,
all but a narrow exception of per se illegal licensing restrictions are
valid unless and until challenged, and the anticompetitive effects of
the agreement are proven to outweigh the procompetitive effects. In
contrast, under EU law, "Article 85(1) prohibits (and imposes the
sanction of nullity under Article 85(2) in respect of) all restrictive
agreements, regardless of whether these agreements are, on balance,
procompetitive, unless the agreements in question have been formally
exempted pursuant to an individual decision under Article 85(3), or a
block exemption adopted pursuant thereto." 3 One commentator
82. Article 85 states as follows:
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common
market; all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations
of undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between
Member States and which have as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the common market, and
in particular those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other
trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or
investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other
parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or
according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of
such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be
automatically void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable in the
case of.
- any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
- any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
- any concerted practices or category of concerted practices;
which contribute to improving the production or distribution of goods or to
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair
share of the resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not
indispensable to the attainment of these objects;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition
in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. (C 191) 1 (1992),
[1992] C.M.LR. 573.
83. Guttuso, supra note 80, at 235 (emphasis added). According to European
Commission official Helmuth Schr6ter, "Following a continental European tradition
(i.e. a prohibition mitigated by statutory exceptions or possible exemptions) the
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noted that "Article 85(1) is a general rule to be strictly applied and
Article 85(3) is an exception to be restrictively applied." '
Unlike the American tradition, EU competition law views all
licenses as "guilty until proven innocent" under article 85(3).-' More
specifically, it treats all licenses (and in fact, all agreements, decisions
and concerted practices) which have, as their object or effect, the
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition and may affect
trade between EU Member States as violating the prohibition of
article 85(1). 6 However, its broad scope notwithstanding, one may
declare article 85(1) inapplicable if the license meets all four
requirements of article 85(3):
(1) Contribute to improving production or distribution of goods
or to promoting technical or economic progress;
(2) Allow consumers to realize a "fair share" of the resulting
benefit;
(3) Be the minimum restriction necessary to achieve the first
two requirements; and
(4) Not create the possibility of eliminating competition in
respect of a substantial part of the market in question.'
Pursuant to authority granted in Regulation 19/65/EEC, the
Commission developed the block exemption format as a mechanism
for en masse application requesting "exoneration" of article 85(3).
This regulation sets out parameters for agreements which, although
caught by the prohibition of article 85(1), are customarily regarded as
satisfying the conditions laid down in article 85(3). Moreover, as
developed infra, the block exemption format serves as a means of
providing much needed definition and predictability to the
expansively phrased article 85.
A lot of attention has focused on the concurrent development of
the new technology transfer block exemption in the EU and the 1995
writers of the EEC Treaty softened the far-reaching ban on restrictive agreements in
Article 85(1) by an exemption rule laid down in Article 85(3)." SchrOter, supra note
80, at 652.
84. Judge Mertens de Wilmars, Judicial Review of EEC Competition Cases: Panel
Discussion, 1988 FORDHAM CoRp. L. INSTrr. 636.
85. See, e.g., Ronald W. Davis & M. Elaine Johnston, Contrast or Convergence:
The IP Guidelines and the New EU Technology Transfer Block Exemption,
ANTiTRUST, Spring 1995, at 16.
86. See supra note 82 for text of article 85(1).
87. Id.
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Intellectual Property Guidelines in the United States. While critics
once viewed patents and other intellectual property rights with
disfavor or skepticism, EU and U.S. officials now readily embrace
such intellectual property protection in recognition of the prominent
role technological innovation plays in the health of their respective
economies! ' Nonetheless, there remains continual struggle over the
"right" balance between intellectual property protection and antitrust
considerations needed to foster optimal innovation." Therefore,
gauging recent changes in current antitrust policy requires closer
inspection of its concrete expression.
B. The EU Technology Transfer Block Exemption
April 1, 1996 saw the implementation of the new "Commission
Regulation (EC) No. 240/96 of 31 January 1996 on the application of
Article 85(3) of the Treaty to certain categories of technology transfer
agreements" (hereinafter the "new Regulation" or "new block
exemption")." Previously, the patent license block exemptio' and
the know-how license block exemption covered the licensing of those
"certain categories," namely patents, know-how and "mixed" licenses
of both patents and know-how.' However, in "recognition of the
stimulus provided by technology transfers to economic development
88. See generally XXIVTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1994, supra note 3;
IP Guidelines, supra note 7.
89. See, e.g., Kobak, supra note 37, at 343-44, where he recounts the antipathy
towards intellectual property rights on the part of Supreme Court justices, federal
court judges, enforcement officials and even economists from the 1940s through the
1970s. For example, "the 'Nine No-Nos' were announced by the Department of
Justice in 1972, which seemed to presuppose the worst possible motives for license
agreements and treated many cross-licensing agreements as per se illegal, [and thus]
typified the hostility among enforcement officials." Id. at 345.
90. Commission Regulation 240196 of 31 January 1996 on the Application of
Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Technology Transfer
Agreements, 1996 OJ. (L 31) 2. Although the Draft version of Regulation 240196
was officially published for circulation and comment on June 30, 1994 (see infra note
94), the European Commission temporarily renewed the effective period of the
expiring patent block exemption (see infra note 91) in order to extend the period for
public comment and reaction to the proposed new block exemption.
91. Commission Regulation 2349184 of 23 July 1984 on the Application of Article
85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Patent Licensing Agreements, 1984 0J.
(L 219) 15, corrected by 1985 OJ. (L 13) 34.
92. Commission Regulation 556189 of 30 November 1988 on the Application of
Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Certain Categories of Know-How Licensing
Agreements, 1989 OJ. (L 61) 1.
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in today's society as highlighted in the 'White Paper on Growth,
Competitiveness and Employment,'" 3 the Commission initiated
extended consultation with Member States, representatives of
industry, academics and other interested parties in order to simplify
and improve the legal constraints on such intellectual property
licenses.' By removing the disparities between the old patent and
know-how block exemptions, increasing the latitude of automatic
exemption and enhancing legal certainty, the Commission specifically
crafted the new Regulation to encourage innovation and facilitate the
dissemination of technology within the EU. While not revolutionary,
the final version of the new technology transfer blo-k exemption
represents a noteworthy advancement in the ever-sensitive balance
between antitrust and intellectual property rights issues."'
Before summarizing the contents of the new Regulation, one
should note that the final version of the new Regulation differs
significantly from the proposed draft regulation that was the subject
of considerable review and commentary.96 In particular, two critical
93. Jean Franqois Pons, Competition and Dissemination of Innovation. The New
Block Exemption Regulation for Technology Transfer Agreements (hst modified May
6, 1996) <http:leuropa.eu.intencommdgO4/speechlsLx/en/sp96020.htm>.
94. The Draft Regulation, which was substantially different from the final
version, was published at 1994 O.J. (C 178) 3. See Valentine Korah, The Preliminary
Draft of a New EC Group Exemption for Technology Licensing, 1994 EUR. Bus. L.
REV. 167. See generally XXIVTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1994, supra note
3, at 86-88; Chris Mitropoulos, Technology Transfer: The New Regulation, EC
COMPETITION POL'Y NEWSL., Spring 1996, at 10; Panel Discussion: Licensing Block
Exemptions and Essential Facilities, 1995 FORDHAM CORP. L. INSTIT. 345 [hereinafter
Licensing Block Exemptions Panel Discussion].
95. The XXVth Report on Competition Policy 1995, conveys the antitrust policy
considerations regarding articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome as manifested in
the new technology block exemption:
Vertical arrangements between suppliers and distributors are a core element
of European competition policy in this field. Some of these arrangements
may be necessary to penetrate new markets, launch new products or
promote efficient distribution networks and might thereby benefit
consumers. Problems may, however, arise where there is not enough
competition between producers or between distributors in the same markets
or where the arrangements are used for anti-competitive purposes, i.e. for
market-partitioning or for restricting access to the markets by new entrants.
XXVTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1995, supra note 11, at 23.
96. See, e.g., XXIVTm REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1994, supra note 3, at 86-
88; Guttuso, supra note 80, at 227; Valentine Korah, Technology Licensing and the
New Draft Block Exemption for Technology Transfer, Address Before the IBC
Legal Studies and Services Limited Conference, EC Competition Law: An
Authoritative Analysis of Major Developments in the Field of EC Competition Law
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areas should be highlighted. First, after a storm of criticism from the
private sector, the final version dropped the highly debated market
share threshold screens for automatic exemption eligibility.' The
legal and legislative division (Section A-2) of the Directorate General
for Competition (DG IV) of the EC Commission recently provided
the following explanation for the Commission's retreat:
As mentioned, the new regulation no longer contains the
controversial market share ceilings of 40%, which, if exceeded,
would cause the loss of automatic exemption. The Commission,
which invested much political capital in the market share
thresholds, conceded that the quantitative techniques required for
assessing market share were costly and difficult to apply, especially
when the technology was new and it was difficult to know how
effective it would be. It, therefore, compromised and dropped the
necessity for automatic notification whenever the aforementioned
threshold was reached. It reasoned that its main concern, namely
to ensure a broader dissemination of new technologies, could be
achieved by less rigid methods. '
In fact, in addition to the forty-percent licensee market share
limit for non-concentrated markets, the draft version proposed an
eligibility limit for territorially protective restrictions of ten percent in
the case of oligopolistic markets.2 These proposed thresholds
reflected the Commission's awareness that the previous patent and
know-how block exemptions failed to adequately consider the
interplay of market structure and intellectual property licensing.'
Jean Franqois Pons of DG IV gave further insight into the
reluctance with which the Commission compromised on the issue of
and Policy for Senior Competition Law Specialists in Industry and in Private Practice,
in Brussels (Nov. 8-9,1994).
97. See Pons, supra note 93, at 2. According to Sebastiano Guttuso, head of the
Intellectual Property Rights division of DG IV:
Nearly all parties submitting observations opposed the introduction of
market share ceilings on the grounds that this would decrease legal certainty.
notwithstanding the fact that the Commission has employed such thresholds
in its R&D block exemption Regulation. According to the comments, legal
certainty would be decreased either because of the difficulty in defining the
market and calculating market shares or because of the exclusion of large
numbers of agreements from the protection of the block exemption.
Guttuso, supra note 80, at 231-32.
98. Mitropoulos, supra note 94, at 12.
99. Commission Draft Regulation 240196, art. 1(5), 1994 OJ. (C 178) 3.
100. See, eg., Guttuso, supra note SO, at 239.
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market thresholds and automatic block exemption eligibility:
From the outset, given the primary objective of disseminating
new technology in a competitive climate in the Community, the
Commission considered the current rules inadequate in that they
took no account of undertakings' economic power and the danger
that companies with a significant market share could potentially
block the implementation of innovation which would compete with
their products and processes.
You will recall the Commission, influenced by the Tetra Pak case
and similar cases, initially favored a solution which would have
excluded from the benefit of an automatic exemption a greements
granting territorial exclusivity in favour of a licensee which was part
of a close oligopoly of which, at the time the agreement was made,
had a market share of at least 40%. After heated discussion with
several industry groups (in particular UNICE and the European
Commission of [Licensing Executives Society] International) the
Commission decided to adopt a less rigid position and reserve the
40% market share threshold only as a criterion for possible
withdrawal of the benefit of the exemption.""'
101. Pons, supra note 93, at 2. According to Sebastiano Guttuso cf DG IV:
The Commission's approach with respect to market share ceilings has in part
been in response to the judgement of the European Court of Justice in the
Tetra Pak case. In that judgement the Court held that Article 86 could apply
to the acquisition of an exclusive license by a company in a dominant
position, notwithstanding the fact that the license agreement in question may
have been covered by Regulation No. 2349/84.
Guttuso, supra note 80, at 239.
In the Tetra Pak decision, Case T-51/89, Tetra Pak Rausing S.A. v.
Commission, 1990 E.C.R 11-309, [1991] 4 C.M.L.R. 334, the Euxopean Court of
Justice determined that licensing agreements containing, among others things,
territorial restrictions as permitted by article 1 of the then currmnt patent block
exemption (and therefore not caught by article 85) may nonetheless constitute an
abuse of a dominant position in contravention of article 86. Tetra Pak was essentially
a monopolist in the aseptic food packaging market, as well as having the lead position
in the non-aseptic food packaging market. The otherwise valid licensing restrictions,
coupled with high market shares, enabled Tetra Pak to compartmentalize the
national markets for its products within the Community and to perpetuate a
differentiated and discriminatory pricing policy. It is interesting to note that many of
the licensing provisions at issue in Tetra Pak would also pass muster under the final
version of the new technology transfer regulation and would not require notification
of or prior approval by the EC Commission. See Licensing Block Exemptions Panel
Discussion, supra note 94, at 347-48 (voicing concern with potential overlapping of
Article 86 abuse of dominant position analysis in review of agreements notified under
new technology transfer block exemption).
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Accordingly, while automatic exemption from article 85(1) for patent,
know-how or mixed licensing agreements remains ostensibly available
regardless of market share or market structure, article 7(1) of the new
Regulation makes clear that the Commission remains particularly
sensitive to the potentially harmful combination of territorial
exclusivity and market power.'
The second point on which the final version of the Regulation
departs from the Draft version is the retention of a modified
opposition procedure. The XXIVth Report on Competition Policy-
102. Regulation 240196, article 7 states:
The Commission may withdraw the benefit of this Regulation, pursuant to
Article 7 of Regulation No 19165/EEC, where it finds in a particular case that
an agreement exempted by this Regulation nevertheless has certain effects
which are incompatible with the conditions laid do~va in Article 85 (3) of the
Treaty, and in particular where:
(1) the effect of the agreement is to prevent the licensed products from
being exposed to effective competition in the licensed territory
from identical goods or services or from goods or services
considered by users as interchangeable or substitutable in view of
their characteristics, price and intended use, which may in
particular occur where the licensee's market share exceeds 40?3.
Commission Regulation 240196, supra note 90, at art. 7. Recital 27 of the preamble of
Regulation 240/96 echoes the policy behind article 7:
Agreements which come within the terms of Articles 1 and 2 and which have
neither the object nor the effect of restricting competition in any other way
need no longer be notified. Nevertheless, undertakings will still have the
right to apply in individual cases for negative clearance or for exemption
under Article 85(3) in accordance with Council Regulation No 17, as last
amended by the Act of Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden. They can
in particular notify agreements obliging the licensor not to grant other
licenses in the territory, where the licensee's market share exceeds or is
likely to exceed 40%.
Id- (citation omitted). Moreover, the XXVth Report on Competition Policy 1995
makes it equally clear that the new Regulation, while expansive in other respects,
renews the emphasis of EU authorities on vigilant scrutiny of entry and access
barriers to competition:
This relaxation of the rules [in the new Regulation], which will benefit most
operators in the Community is, however, accompanied by a clear warning to
enterprises with strong market positions: the benefit of the block exemption
can be withdrawn if enterprises use their exclusive licenses to monopolize
the market for a product and prevent third parties from gaining access to
new technologies. When assessing such cases, the Commission wil pay
particular attention to situations in which the market share of the licensee
exceeds a threshold of 40%.
XXVTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1995, supra note 11, at 35. Compare infra
notes 197-208 and accompanying text discussing the DOJ/FTC Intellectual Property
Guidelines and the twenty percent safety zone of section 4.3.
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1994 disclosed that the proposed abolition of the notification
procedure stemmed from the fact that it "in the past did not produce
satisfactory results"'" and was apparently under-utilized. However,
strong reaction against eliminating this feature resulted in an
improvement in the opposition procedure specifically and the
function of the new Regulation as a whole."w Under the new system,
licensing agreements containing provisions not expressly exempted by
articles 1 or 2, yet not falling within the scope of the "Black List" of
article 3, must register with the Commission." The Commission then
has four months (a reduction from the former six-month period) in
which it may oppose the contract provision in question."° Firms
clearly benefit from a one-third reduction in regulatory review delay.
More significantly (as discussed infra), the increased range of
permitted licensing provisions-as more reflective of the reality of the
marketplace-should encourage the spread of innovation and
technology."
1. Scope of Regulation 240/96
As delineated in article 1, the new Regulation covers only two-
party agreements for pure patent licensing, pure know-how licensing,
mixed licenses of patents and know-how and ancillary provisions
regarding non-patent intellectual property rights. The rubric "patent"
includes "patent applications, utility models, supplementary
protection certificates for pharmaceutical or other products and other
103. XXIVTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1994, supra note 3, at 87.
104. Id. at 88; see also John Ratliff, Reflections on Major Events in the Past Year,
Address Before the IBC Legal Studies and Services Limited Conference, EC
Competition Law: An Authoritative Analysis of Major Developments in the Field of
EC Competition Law and Policy for Senior Competition Law Specihlists in Industry
and in Private Practice, in Brussels (Nov. 8-9, 1994).
105. Regulation 240/96, supra note 90, at art. 4. As part of the reduction of the
Black List in article 3, and in recognition of the de minimis concept of market harm,
several items were moved to the Grey List in article 4.
106. Regulation 240/96, supra note 90, at art. 4 (1), (5). According to article 4(5), a
Member State has a two month window in which to request opposition by the
Commission based on the competition rules of the Treaty of Rome.
107. See, e.g., Mitropoulos, supra note 94, at 12 ("It is believed that a reduction in
the number of black listed clauses, an extension of the permissible restrictions and an
opposition procedure covering previously outlawed clauses will promote the
contractual freedom of the parties and allay industry's concerns of an interventionist
approach.").
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patent-type intellectual property rights..'. However:
agreements that license intellectual property rights other than
patents (trademarks, copyrights and design rights) or software
licenses fall outside the ambit of the technology transfer block
exemption, unless these rights or software 'assist in achieving the
object of the licensed technology' and are not treated more
restrictively than the licensed know-how or patents.U
Article 5 outlines additional restrictions on the applicability of the
new Regulation, covering situations such as patent pools, joint
ventures, cross-licensing between competitors, non-ancillary, non-
patent intellectual property and sales agreements.
2. Article 1: Automatically Exempted Obligations
Article 1, which could be characterized as the "Per se Legal
List,"' 0 sets forth the following eight types of territory-based
restrictive obligations typically included in technology licenses:
(1) An obligation on the licensor not to license others in the
licensed territory;
(2) An obligation on the licensor not to exploit the technology in
the licensed territory;
(3) An obligation on the licensee not to exploit the technology in
territories reserved for the licensor;
(4) An obligation on the licensee not to manufacture or use the
product or process in territories reserved for other licensees;
(5) An obligation on licensees not to pursue active sales (e.g.,
advertising, maintaining distribution depots, establishing a
108. Guttuso, supra note 80, at 228.
109. 1& (paraphrasing recital 6 of Regulation 240196). Cf. Commission Regulation
240196, supra note 90, at art. 5(1)(4) (the block exemption is not available to licenses
"containing provisions to intellectual property rights other than patents which are not
ancillary.").
110. See Davis & Johnston, supra note 85, at 17. Observe, however, that these
authors' comments regarding the market share thresholds contained in the draft
version of Regulation 240196 are no longer applicable. As the territorial restrictions
of Regulation 240/96 article 1 are virtually identical to counterparts in the patent and
know-how block exemptions, analysis and commentary regarding those earlier block
exemptions and the "per se legality" of these territorial restraints is relevant. See,
eg., VALENTINE KORAH, PATENT LICENSING AND EEC CoMPETrriO, RULEs:
REGULATION 2349184 (1985); Yves Jeanrenaud, Eclusive Licenses of Patent Rights
and Territorial Restraints in the EEC: Certainty vs. Flexibility, 26 SwiSs REv. L'd'L
COMPETITION L. 21 (1986).
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branch, etc.) in territories licensed to other licensees;
(6) An obligation on the licensee not to market the product in
territories licensed to other licensees, even as to unsolicited
orders;
(7) An obligation to use the licensor's trademark or manner of
distinguishing the product as long as the licensee can identify
itself as the manufacturer; and
(8) An obligation on the licensee to limit production and/or sales
of the licensed product to input requirements amounts for
production of the licensee's own product."'
As progeny of the Maize Seed" doctrine first embodied in the former
patent and know-how block exemptions, these automatically
exempted provisions reflect an ongoing balance between a Chicago-
style belief in the stimulating effect of such limited territorial
restrictions on innovation and market entry, balanced against the
Commission's perpetual quest to prevent the erection of artificial
trade barriers."'
Paragraphs 2 through 4 provide time limitations for the
automatically exempted restrictions in article 1. The clock begins to
run on the date the licensee first puts the licensed product into
111. Commission Regulation 240/96, supra note 90, at art. 1(1).
112. Case 25878, L.C. Nungesser v. E.C. Commission, 1982 E.C.R. 3381, [1983] 1
C.M.L.R. 278 [hereinafter Maize Seed].
113. See, e.g., Mitropoulos, supra note 94, at 11 ("Such territoria' restrictions are
considered to improve the production of goods and promote technical progress in
that they make the holders of patents or know-how more willing to grant licenses.
Licensees are in turn more inclined to undertake the investment required to
manufacture and put a new product on the market. In this respect the regulation
[240/96] confirms the Maize Seed doctrine."); see also Commission Regulation 240/96,
supra note 90, at recital 10 (justifying territorial restrictions on the enhancement of
interbrand competition and the level of protection needed to induce scale of
research); Davis & Johnston, supra note 85, at 19 ("Some European antitrust lawyers
view Maize Seed as the thin edge of the wedge by which something like a U.S. style
rule of reason balancing test has been introduced into Article 85(1)."). The new
Regulation and its predecessors must be viewed, however, against a continuing
tradition of suspicion or unease regarding agreements that partition markets. See,
e.g., XXVTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1995, supra note 11, at 24 ("It is one
of the most well-established principles of Community competition law that producers
are forbidden to divide the internal market by private agreements and to maintain
price differences by arranging anti-competitive absolute territerial protection.
However, such behaviour continues to occur on the market and, where it comes to
light, one can expect severe action by the Commission.").
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circulation within the EU."' Generally speaking, the territorial
limitations in subsections (1) through (5) can remain lawfully in effect
for the life of the patent under a pure patent license or for ten years in
the case of a pure know-how license. In the ease of a mixed license,
the limitations remain in effect for whichever period is longer: the life
of the patent or ten years. Obligations under subsections (7) and (8)
shall remain in effect for the life of the patent, or in the case of a pure
know-how license, for as long as the know-how remains secret and
substantial. One should take special note of the five-year limit on
restrictions against passive sales set forth in subsection (6), thus
affording absolute territorial protection during this time period."'
3. Article 2: Permissible Obligations (The White List)
The expansion of the "White List" of permissible obligations set
114. Commission Regulation 240196, supra note 90, at art. 1(2), (3).
115. Stated otherwise, for a five-year period, a licensee may be prohibited from
consummating sales in another licensee's territory, even though the orders -were
unsolicited. The net effect, by virtue of restrictions on other licencees, is complete
elimination of intrabrand competition against a particular licensee. Earlier, with
regard to an identical provision under both the patent and know-how block
exemptions, the Commission drew fire for its distinction in time limitations for active
and passive sales:
In the Regulation [2349/84] the Commission does not give any reason for
this [time limits] distinction between active and passive competition aith
regard to the protection of a licensee from parallel licensees. It do. s not
explain either the grounds for a five year period during which a licensor may
protect one licensee against passive competition from parallel l
However, this five year period seems rather to be the result of a
compromise. The Commission was opposed to such a protection against
passive competition until March 1984 and seems to have accepted the five
year solution in response to the critics of the Economic and Social
Committee that considered the Commission's 'to get far from ideal from the
licensee's point of view who would rather have a period of five-to-seven
years protection against passive sales.' The Commission eventually agreed
to a five year protection, but only from the date when the product has been
first put on the market within the EEC.
Jeanrenaud, supra note 110, at 30. However, despite such criticism, one may
appreciate that this temporary grant of absolute territorial exclusivity actually goes
beyond the holding of the Maize Seed case. See Maize Seed, supra note 112, at paras.
77-78 (European Court of Justice maintaining that "'absolute territorial protection
manifestly goes beyond what is indispensable for the improvement of production or
distribution or the promotion of technical progress"). Cf. X.XVTH REoRT o.N
COmn'E-TIoN POLICY 1995, supra note 11, at 16 ("The Commission is vigilant in
applying Community competition rules where firms attempt to stifle the pro-
competitive effects emanating from internal market integration through anti-
competitive behavior designed to sustain market segmentation.").
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forth in article 2 stands as one important improvement in the new
Regulation. The eighteen different clauses enumerated therein,
which technology transfer agreements commonly include, are
described as "generally not restrictive of competition.""' However,
recital 18 of the new Regulation states that "[t]his list, in Article 2, is
not exhaustive.""7  Some of the new additions include: the
reservation of right by the licensor to terminate the agreement if the
licensee challenges the validity of the patent or secret or substantial
nature of the know-how;11 the right of the licensor to terminate
exclusivity and to stop licensing improvements when the licensee
enters into competition with the licensor within the common
market;..9 and the right of the licensor to exercise the rights conferred
by the patent to oppose the licensee's exploitation of the technology
outside the licensed territory."z Inclusion of these or any other White
List provisions merit the same treatment as the restriclions in article
1, namely, automatic exemption."2 ' Moreover, paragraph 2, while
somewhat laboriously constructed, nevertheless reinforces the leeway
given these types of obligations, stating "[i]n the event that, because
of particular circumstances, the clauses referred to in paragraph 1 (of
Article 2) fall within the scope of Article 85(1), they shall be
exempted even if they are not accompanied by any of the obligations
exempted by Article 1.' Paragraph 3 extends the exemption
granted in paragraph 2 to clauses of the type specified in paragraph 1,
"but with a more limited scope than permitted by that paragraph.""'2
4. Article 3: Prohibited Obligations (The Black List)
The reduction in the number of "Black List" clauses found in
article 3 represents yet another important improvement in the new
Regulation. According to Pons, "In order to facilitate technology
transfers the black list has been significantly reduced-almost by
116. Commission Regulation 240/96, supra note 90, at art. 2(1).
117. Id. at recital 18.
118. Id. at art. 2(1)(15).
119. Id. at art. 2(1)(18).
120. Id. at art. 2(1)(14).
121. See, e.g., Mitropoulos, supra note 94, at 12 ("Article 2 provides a list of
clauses which are generally not restrictive of competition and whose inclusion in an
agreement does not affect its exemption."); Pons, supra note 93, at 2-3.
122. Commission Regulation 240/96, supra note 90, at art. 2(2).
123. Id. at art. 2(3).
[Vol. 22:209
1999] Intellectual Property and Antitrust: A Comparison of Evolution 239
half-in comparison with the two former regulations (patent and
know-how block exemptions)."" As discussed below, some of the
former Black List restrictions now appear on the Grey List of article
4.' Since inclusion of these blacklisted obligations in a licensing
agreement will preclude exemption from article 85(1) through
operation of the new Regulation," the transfer of once-prohibited
clauses such as tie-ins or no challenge clauses to the "maybe" list
(Grey List) of article 4 signals a liberalizing shift in Commission
policy.' Speaking generally, the "forbidden" obligations are now the
following:
(1) Pricing restrictions;
(2) Restrictions in respect to research and development,
production and use or distribution of competing products,
except as permitted in article 2(1)(17) and (18);
(3) Unjustified restriction of parallel imports, either by written
agreement or concerted practice;
(4) Customer restrictions between competing manufacturers,
except as provided for in article 1(1)(7) or article 2(1)(13);
(5) Production quotas, except as allowed under article 1(1)(8)
and article 2(1)(13);
(6) Exclusive grantbacks of improvements to the licensed
technology; and
124. Pons, supra note 93, at 3.
125. Perhaps most noticeable is the place change of tying clauses from the Black
List to the Grey List. Commission Regulation 240196, supra note 90, at art. 4(2)(a);
see also Davis & Johnston, supra note 85, at 20.
126. Commission Regulation 240196, supra note 90, at art. 3; see Mitropoulos,
supra note 94, at 12 ("The restrictions listed in article 3 are restrictive and not capable
of benefiting from the block exemption."). Readers from outside the EU may find
the structure of the exemption preclusion somewhat unfamiliar. Instead of directly
stating that the clauses under article 3 are caught by article 85(l), or that article 85(3)
is inapplicable, article 3 of the new Regulation merely states that "Article 1 and
Article 2(2) shall not apply" where such clauses are present in an agreement.
127. Commission Regulation 240196, supra note 90, at art. 4(2)(a), (b). According
to Pons, the new Regulation is "a significant improvement on the existing situation"
and "marks a step forward by the Commission towards the creation of a favorable
legal environment for the development of technological innovation and the
dissemination" within the EU, in that "it eliminates, or transfers to the opposition
procedure, several clauses from the old regulations which prevented the block
exemption being obtained and, in order to attach greater respect for the freedom of
parties to contract, it provides for the new acceptable clauses." Pons, supra note 93, at
1,5.
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(7) Extensions, including separate agreements or automatic
prolongation, of the time limits on restrictions on licensors
and/or licensees not to exploit the technology in the other's
territory or in the territory of another licensee as provided in
article 1(1), paragraphs (2), (3) and (4)."
Recital 19 of the preamble to the new Regulation gives more
insight into the status and effect of these prohibited licensing
obligations:
This Regulation must also specify what restrictions or provisions
may not be included in licensing agreements if these are to benefit
from the block exemption. The restrictions listed in Article 3 may
fall under the prohibition of Article 85(1), but in their case there
can be no general presumption that, although they re)'ate to the
transfer of technology, they will lead to the positive effects required
by Article 85(3), as would be necessary for the granting of a block
exemption. Such restrictions can be declared exempt only by an
individual decision, taking account of the market position of the
undertakings concerned and the degree of concentrat on or the
relevant market.29
The likelihood of success upon individual notification may initially
appear questionable, and inclusion of blacklisted clauses clearly
sacrifices the relative certainty and expediency of the new block
exemption. However, the Commission expressed its intention to
broaden and refine application of the de minimis principle, which
reserves enforcement of antitrust rules only for those situations
having an appreciable impact on the market. ' This leaves the
128. Commission Regulation 240/96, supra note 90, at art. 3.
129. Id. at recital 19.
130. The XXVth Report on Competition Policy 1995 reveals that, faced with
limited resources and an ever-increasing caseload, the Commission will have to be
selective in its attention:
Accordingly, the Commission has been considering how to focus on those
arrangements which have a significant effect on competition and are likely to
affect trade between Member States appreciably. For this purpose, several
instruments and concepts have already been developed. Preparatory work is
under way to broaden and refine them further. Particularly relevant in this
respect are the applications of the de minimis principle (in the fields of both
anti-trust and state aid), group exemptions (which allow finns to make
agreements without notifying them to the Commission so as to obtain legal
certainty), and the notion of Community interest in the case of complaints.
XXVTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 1995, supra note 11, at 19; see also Notice
on Agreements of Minor Importance Which Do Not Fall Under Article 85(1), 1986
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ultimate outcome for at least some Black and/or Grey List clauses
open, further reducing the legal certainty of the new block exemption.
5. Article 4: Opposition Procedure and the Grey List
As already mentioned, vehement outcry against the potential
elimination of the opposition procedure from the new Regulation
resulted not only in its retention, but in an overall improvement of the
notification process as well. As Sebastiano Guttuso of DG IV
observed, "Most respondents (to the proposed Draft Regulation)
were opposed to the abandonment of the opposition procedure. They
took the view that an accelerated review procedure is of considerable
benefit and increases both flexibility and legal certainty."'-' As a
result of public input, the Commission therefore not only reinstated
the opposition procedure in the final version of Regulation 240196 but
decreased the time limit for review of notifications from six months to
four months.L' In addition, the Commission indicated the possible
sufficiency of a less burdensome notification document, and that it
"will generally be content with the communication of the text of the
agreement and with an estimate, based on directly available data, of
the market structure and of the licensee's market share.""
Article 4 provides that clauses that restrict competition and are
not specifically exempted by articles 1 and 2, yet do not fall within the
prohibition of article 3 (colloquially deemed "Grey List" clauses),
require notification to the Commission to acquire exemption from
article 85(1).' This structure was purposefully designed to provide a
flexible approach to a myriad of possible licensing situations.
However, article 4 particularly identifies the following obligations as
requiring notification:
(1) Obligations to accept quality specifications, tied licenses or
tied goods or services not necessary for conforming to quality
standards or technically satisfactory use of the technology;
OJ. (C 231) 2 (de minimis threshold of 5%).
131. Guttuso, supra note 80, at 232.
132. Commission Regulation 240196, supra note 90, at art. 4(1), (3). (5). According
to article 4(5), the Commission shall oppose exemption if requested to do so by a
Member State, based on Community competition rules, within two months of
receiving the notification at issue from the Commission.
132. Id. at recital 25.
133. Id.
134. ld. at art. 4(1).
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and
(2) Obligations not to challenge the validity of patents or the
secrecy and substantiality of know-how.1 35
As discussed in connection with article 3, tying obligations and
no-challenge clauses have metamorphosed from the Black List to the
Grey List."3  This raises questions regarding the Commission's
position regarding other formerly blacklisted provisions. Whether the
implication holds true for a hierarchy of tolerance for Grey List
clauses, ascending from those expressly included in article 4 down to
those deleted from the Black List (and thus now "Grey"?) remains to
be seen. Nonetheless, inclusion of a Grey List (or Black List) clause
without requisite notification can result in what some scholars have
called "the sanction of nullity" under article 85(2), which states that
"[a]ny agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article
(85) shall be automatically void."' ' Whether one can sever the
offending clause or the entire agreement is deemed void and
unenforceable even against a breaching party is an issue governed by
national law.l
6. Article 7: Withdrawal of Exemption
Article 7 functions as a safeguard mechanism, pe.rmitting the
Commission to withdraw the benefit of the block exemption in
situations where, despite contractual conformity to the parameters of
the new Regulation, the Commission determines that an agreement
has "certain effects which are incompatible with the conditions laid
down in Article 85(3) of the Treaty...."139 Article 7 indicates the
135. Id. at art. 4(2)(a), (b). Note that the flexibility of the Grey List is a trade-off
on the legal predictability of articles 1 and 2.
136. See supra notes 121-27 and accompanying text.
137. See Davis & Johnston, supra note 85, at 20.
138. Id.
139. Commission Regulation 240/96, supra note 90, at art. 7. This is essentially the
situation that occurred in the Tetra Pak case, discussed supra note 101 and
accompanying text. Article 85(3) provides that:
The provision of paragraph 1 (Article 85(1)) may, however, be declared
inapplicable in the case of any agreement or category of agreements
between undertakings; any decision or category of decisions by .associations
of undertakings; any concerted practice or category of concerted practices;
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or to
promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a fair
share of the resulting benefits, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not
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following four basic situations which, if created through the licensing
relationship, would necessitate withdrawal of the exemption grant:
(1) The licensed product is prevented from exposure to
effective competition, "which may in particular occur where
the licensee's market share exceeds 40%";',"
(2) Without prejudice to article 1(l)(6), the licensee refuses,
without any objectively justified reason, to meet unsolicited
orders from users or resellers in the territory of other
licensees;
(3) The parties attempt to block parallel imports; and
(4) The parties, who were competing manufacturers prior to
the agreement, employ either minimum quantity production
quotas or best efforts requirements, which in effect prevent
the licensee from using competing technology.'
Withdrawal of the automatic exemption takes effect only as of the
date of the Commission's decision. Accordingly, Regulation 240196
(or recital 27) suggested that, in order to protect against an
unexpected withdrawal of the block exemption, undertakings can "in
particular notify agreements obliging the licensor not to grant other
licenses in the territory, where the licensee's market share exceeds or
is likely to exceed 40%. ' 142
indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition
in respect of a substantial part of the products in question.
140. As developed infra notes 96-102 and accompanying text, although the
Commission reluctantly capitulated on not using market share thresholds as an
automatic eligibility cutoff for the new block exemption, this remains a -live" factor
with regard to withdrawal of the exemption. As the Commission recently indicated:
[M]arket shares for a licensee which are of the order mentioned (40, w %vill
continue to be an important factor in the general economic assessment
which must be made by the Commission when deciding whether to withdraw
the benefit of the block exemption. The Commission's aim is to prevent
agreements where the licensed products are not faced with real competition
in the licensed territory and it considers this to be the case where the
licensee's share of the market exceeds 40% of the whole market for the
licensed product, and of all the products or services which customers
consider interchangeable or substitutable on account of their characteristics,
prices or intended use.
Mitropoulos, supra note 94, at 13; see also Commission Regulation 240!96, supra note
90, at recital 26.
141. Commission Regulation 240196, supra note 90, at art.7.
142. Id. at recital 27.
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C. The United States: The 1995 DOJ and FTC Intellectual
Property Guidelines
On April 6, 1995 the DOJ and the FTC issued "Antitrust
Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property-1995" (the IP
Guidelines)."' They were released one day after the issuance of the
International Operations Guidelines1" summarized supra.14' One self-
proclaimed purpose of the IP Guidelines was to "refine and replace
the 'Intellectual Property Licensing Arrangements' section" of the
now superseded Department of Justice Antitrust Enforcement
Guidelines for International Operations-1988 (the 1988 Guidelines). 4'
This represented a dramatic shift from the position of the DOJ in
1970 that there existed nine typical licensing restrictions that would
be deemed per se violations without further inquiry into market
power or effect on competition. Scholars described the 1988
Guidelines, which declared that "[t]he owner of intellectual property
is entitled to enjoy whatever market power the property itself may
confer,"147 as "an insightful and revolutionary document for its
decade." ' Most commentators, therefore, are pleased to observe
that the 1995 IT Guidelines do not appear to signal a radical
departure from the precepts of the preceding Guidelines.'49
143. IP Guidelines, supra note 7.
144. International Operations Guidelines, supra note 23.
145. See notes 48-79 and accompanying text.
146. Department of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International
Operations-1988, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,109 (1997) [hereinafter 1988
Guidelines].
147. Id. § 3.6.
148. Janusz Ordover & Robert D. Willig, Economists' View: Th.? Department of
Justice Draft Guidelines for the Licensing and Acquisition of Intelectual Property,
ANTrrRUST, Spring 1995, at 29 ("The 1988 Guidelines remains an insightful and
revolutionary document for its decade, although "justifiable doubts arise today as to
its relevance to the enforcement policy of the Department of Justice of the mid-
1990s.").
149. See generally Richard J. Gilbert. Defining the Crossroad? of Intellectual
Property and the Antitrust Laws: The 1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of
Intellectual Property, ANTrrRusT, Summer 1995, at 6; Joseph Kattan, Perspectives on
the 1995 Intellectual Property Guidelines, ANTITRuST, Summer 1995, at 11 ("After all
the sound and fury, the new federal Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of
Intellectual Property... inaugurate no major policy shift in the intellectual property
area" and represent only "incremental changes to the 1988 Guidelines."). But cf.
Kobak, supra note 37, at 350 ("The IT Guidelines, though generally similar, actually
represent in some important respects a retrenchment from tha treatment of
intellectual property in the now-superseded Department of Justice's 1988
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On the one hand, the DOJ intimated that the 1988 Guidelines
were "overly deferential" to intellectual property rights, leading some
critics to query whether the Agencies would rebound toward the
"Nine No-Nos" rigid antitrust approach that characterized the 1970s
and 80s." However, the clarifications and improvements of policy
expressed in the new IE' Guidelines segue smoothly, building on the
open approach to licensing set by the 1988 Guidelines." But despite
the tone of the 1995 [P Guidelines, there remains considerable
speculation, if not apprehension, regarding the current enforcement
proclivities of the Agencies. ' "
International Guidelines."); Robert P. Taylor, Pilkington, Microsoft and S.C.
Johnson Signal a Policy Shift at DOJ, ANTrrRUST, Fall 1994, at 23 ("More distinctly
than the 1988 Guidelines, the 1994 Draft is written as an enforcement document" and
positing that "it is apparent that this Justice Department is likely to be substantially
more interventionist than its predecessors.").
150. Bruce B. Wilson, Patent and Know-How License Agreements Field of Use,
Territorial, Price and Quantity Restrictions, Remarks Before the Fourth New
England Antitrust Conference (1970), available in [Current Comment Transfer
Binder 1969-1983] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) T 50,146; see also ABA AN;TrTrUST
SECrION, ANrrrRusr LAW DEVELOPMENTS 819 n.145 (3d ed. 1992). The infamous
Nine No-Nos include tying, exclusive grantbacks of improvements to the licensed
technology, agreements not to deal with competitors (tie-outs), post-sale vertical
restrictions, mandatory package licensing, obligations granting licensee pre-approval
rights to future licenses, royalties not limited to sale of products incorporating
licensed intellectual property rights, output restrictions and finally, of course, price
fixing. Inclusion of any of the forelisted restraints was a per se antitrust violation,
without regard for the actual effect on competition or the market power of either of
the parties.
151. Economics professors Janusz Ordover and Robert Wilig, each of whom
served as Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Economics, Antitrust Division,
U.S. Department of Justice, characterized the new Guidelines as follows:
[Tihe new IP Guidelines should be commended not only for the sound
policy which they espouse towards the exploitation of [intellectual property
rights (IPR)] but also for their fundamental consistency with the
Department's 1988 policy and its articulation. The new IP Guidelines offer
improved articulations in some respects, and provide an apt platform for the
construction of analytical frameworks that are needed for more complete
illumination of several important issues at the intersection of IPR and
antitrust.
Ordover & Willig, supra note 148, at 29.
152. Draft Agenda for FTC Hearings on Adjusments to Enforcement Policies, 69
Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 72 (July 20, 1995); see also Taylor, supra note
149, at 27 ("Department policy has shifted in the direction of more vigorous
enforcement. How far it has shifted remains highly uncertain."). Summarizing the
circumstances driving Agency policy evolution, James Kobak comments that "[ilt is
clear that the Department [of Justice] is embarking on a major challenge in its effort
to reevaluate the proper accommodation between the intellectual property and
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
From an international viewpoint, the concurrence of such
regulatory and policy developments on both sides of the Atlantic,
coupled with the expressly recognized goal of coordination and
cooperation by authorities in both the EU and the United States,
emphasizes the similarities between Regulation 240/96 and the IP
Guidelines.' Indeed, one may safely argue that there currently exists
a greater degree of convergence in antitrust policy, regulation and
enforcement than ever before between the EU and the United
States." However, failure to appreciate the sometimes subtle yet
consequential differences in antitrust treatment of intellectual
property between the United States and the EU can be a costly
oversight. As one experienced practitioner cautioned, "But even
when the broad principles seem to be agreed upon, down at the micro
level, where deals must be done and clients advised, the finer points
differ, sometimes dramatically."'5  It therefore remains useful, in
reviewing the substance of the IP Guidelines, to draw comparisons
not only between previous U.S. positions but between those of the
EU as well.156
antitrust laws in an age of information superhighways, telecommunication
revolutions, and other major technological breakthroughs." Kobak, s'upra note 37, at
672.
153. See Bingaman Finds Climate of Trust in Prosecution of International Cases,
supra note 22; Steiger Lauds Recent Efforts Toward International Convergence of
Antitrust, 62 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 638 (May 14,1992).
154. See generally Guttuso, supra note 80.
155. Kobak, supra note 37, at 341. Kobak sees the contrast in antitrust ideology
and practice in the EU and U.S. as quite sharp, remarking that:
Overall, however, the U.S. approach has become much more flexible and, in
general, more permissive. And this is true, by and large, not only of the IP
Guidelines but of the approach of the judiciary as well. In Europe, by
contrast, over this same time period the law grew less permissive, both in
regulation and in actual practice, especially toward vertical restrictions or
alleged abuses of a leading market position. One need only compare the
way the IBM case terminated in Europe-not with a bang perhaps, but at
least with the whimper of IBM's undertaking to grant access-with the way
the case was simply dropped in the United States. Or one could compare
the decision in the EEC finding a trademark tie-in in the Windsurfing case
illegal with the rule of reason analysis applied by the Court of Appeals of the
Federal Circuit ... in the United States to sustain the same tit. against a
claim of patent misuse.
Id. at 346-47 (citations omitted).
156. For a good synopsis of the key changes from the 1988 Guidelines as
embodied in the 1995 IP Guidelines, see Gilbert, supra note 149.
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1. Sections 1&2: Intellectual Property Protection and the
Antitrust Laws Generally
The Agencies explicitly drafted the IP Guidelines "to assist those
who need to predict whether the Agencies will challenge a practice as
anticompetitive." One should recognize, however, that unlike
Regulation 240/96, the IEP Guidelines exist for the internal use of the
Agencies in determining whether to challenge particular licensing
restrictions, and thus do not necessarily reflect the legal position of
the Agencies in a particular situation.' Rather, the IP Guidelines set
out the general principles, concerns and modes of analysis underlying
the enforcement policy of the Agencies "with respect to the licensing
of intellectual property protected by patent, copyright, and trade
secret law, and know-how."'" Because the IP Guidelines exclusively
cover "technology transfer and innovation-related issues," they do
.aot apply to "product-differentiation issues that typicaly arise with
respect to trademarks."' 9
a. Section 2.0: General Principles
One must examine the coverage of the IP Guidelines in light of
the three general principles carried over from the 1988 Guidelines:
(a) for the purpose of antitrust analysis, the Agencies regard
intellectual property as essentially comparable to any other
form of property;
(b) the Agencies do not presume that intellectual property creates
market power in the antitrust context; and
(c) the Agencies recognize that intellectual property licensing
allows firms to combine complementary factors of production
157. Davis & Johnston, supra note 85, at 16; see also Kobak, supra note 37, at 350
("The IP Guidelines were, after all, intended as guidelines, not as a general release
and covenant not to sue intellectual property licensors and licensees in the United
States."). See Feds Won't Adjust Enforcenent Policies, supra note 5.
158. IP Guidelines, supra note 7, § 1.0.
159. Id. at n.1. Note the difference in types of intellectual property rights covered
by EU Regulation 240196 where copyrights as well as trademarks are excluded, except
to the extent that they are "ancillary" to the licensed patent (or know-how), in %vhich
case they are covered. The IP Guidelines, however, do expressly cover copyrights,
but exclude trademarks, whether ancillary or not.
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and is generally procompetitive.W
b. Section 2.1: Standard Antitrust Analysis Applies to
Intellectual Property
Correspondingly, section 2.1 pledges a policy of "neutrality"
toward intellectual property rights as compared to the treatment of
other types of property rights, indicating that "[ijntellectual property
is thus neither particularly free from scrutiny under the antitrust laws
nor particularly suspect under them." '161 Furthermore, the Agencies
will, in "evaluating the specific market circumstances in which
transactions occur," take into account the varying characteristics of
different types of intellectual property rights.162 Sections 3.4 and 4.7-
4.3 discussed infra more fully develop the framework for such a
comprehensive market inquiry, necessitated by the rule of reason
approach that characterizes the IP Guidelines. 63
Extending the theme of impartiality, section 2.2 addresses the
highly sensitive issue of the presumption of market power based on
intellectual property rights. This section provides that "[t]he
Agencies will not presume that a patent, copyright, or trade secret
necessarily confers market power upon its owner," and thus highlights
the Agencies' awareness that "there will often be sufficient actual or
potential close substitution for such product, process, or work to
prevent the exercise of market power."" The Guidelines go on to
160. Id. § 2.0.
161. Id. § 2.1.
162. Id.
163. See id. §§ 3.4, 4.1-4.3. While maintaining a narrow exception of per se
illegality for practices such as "naked price fixing, output restraints, and market
division among horizontal competitors, as well as certain group boycotts and resale
price maintenance (§ 3.4)," the IP Guidelines reflect the wide latitude afforded
owners in licensing their intellectual property rights. Such latitude is made possible
by the pragmatic approach of the rule of reason, which entails evaluation of the
actual or plausible harm to markets (or the best approximation thereof). This basic
presumption of rule of reason legality, a rather "innocent until provep guilty" case by
case approach, contrasts distinctly with the more categorized and theoretical
approach to technology licensing in the EU.
164. Id. § 2.2. In footnote 10 of § 2.2, the Agencies underscore that the case law is
unclear on this issue, comparing Jefferson Parish Hospital District No. 2 v. Hyde, 466
U.S. 2, 16 (1984) and Abbott Laboratories v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346, 1354-55 (Fed.
Cir. 1991) to Digidyne Corp. v. Data General Corp., 734 F.2d 1336, 134142 (9th Cir.
1984). See also Kattan, supra note 149, at 11 & n.4 ("This principle is statutorily
codified with respect to patent misuse cases. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(5)."); Kobak,
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underscore the position, well supported in case law, that -[i]f a patent
or other form of intellectual property does confer market power, that
market power does not by itself offend the antitrust laws." In
contrast, EU Regulation 240196 remains silent regarding
presumptions of market power from the existence and ownership of
intellectual property rights, although case law has squarely confronted
this issue.'5
Finally, section 2.3 reaffirms the Agencies' recognition of
intellectual property licensing as generally welfare enhancing, in that
such licenses tend to encourage innovation, dissemination and
commercialization of technology developments. Moreover,
discerning the potentially stimulating effect of various exclusivity
restrictions, section 2.3 asserts that "[flield of use, territorial, and
other limitations on intellectual property licenses may serve
procompetitive ends by allowing the licensor to exploit its property as
efficiently and effectively as possible."'" Likewise, the prevention of
supra note 37, at 674-75.
165. IP Guidelines, supra note 7, § 2.2. This section continues in clarification that
"[a]s with any other tangible or intangible asset that enables its owner to obtain
significant supra-competitive profits, market power (or even a monopoly) that is
solely 'a consequence of a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident'
does not violate the antitrust laws." (citations omitted).
166. The issue of market power presumption based on ownership of intellectual
property rights was encountered in the Deutdze Grammophon case. Case 78170,
Deutsche Grammophon GmbH v. Metro-SB Gross Markle GmbH & Co., KG, 1971
E.C.R. 487, 506-07, 1971 C.M.LR. 631 (holding that only certain anticompetitive
exercises of distribution rights and not the existence of such rights constitute unlaiful
market power). Insightful is the summary by EC Commission official Sebastiano
Guttuso, who observed:
The Guidelines state that the DOJ will not presume the existence of market
power from the existence of intellectual property right. The position under
Community law as reflected in the ECJ's Deutsche Grammophon judgement
is similar: the existence of an intellectual property right (in that case a
copyright) does not itself give rise to a dominant position. Rather, the
existence of a dominant position is to be determined on the basis of an
analysis of competitive conditions in the relevant market. If the product
covered by an intellectual property right is subject to competition from
substitutable products in the same geographic market, there will be no
dominant position notwithstanding the existence of the monopoly conferred
by the intellectual property right.
Guttuso, supra note 80, at 239.
167. IP Guidelines, supra note 7, § 2.3. As author Joseph Kattan noted,
"Although license restriction can adversely affect competition where limited field of
use or territorial grants are used by cartels to allocate markets, the IP Guidelines
properly recognize that these limitations tend to be beneficial outside this specific
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free-riding, made possible by permitted exclusivity provisions,
encourages licensees to make the necessary investments in order to
capitalize on the licensed technology, copyrighted material, trade
secret or know-how.'6' Thus, while more abridged than the treatment
in Regulation 240/96, the IP Guidelines express a markedly similar
stance on the procompetitiveness of technology and intellectual
property licensing in general.69 However, scholars have remarked
that the strict time limitations placed on territorial exclusivity
provisions subject to EU jurisdiction remain a pivotal difference from
the U.S. approach.'
2. Section 3: Antitrust Concerns and Modes of Analysis
Section 3.1 brings into focus the nature of the Agencies' antitrust
concerns when reviewing intellectual property licenses. Of particular
concern is the situation where "a licensing arrangement harms
competition among entities that would have been actual or likely
potential competitors in a relevant market in the absence of the license
(entities in a 'horizontal relationship').... In fact, the axial nature of
the horizontal-vertical distinction in U.S. antitrust regulation is cause
for its separate, more detailed treatment in subsections 3.3 and 5.1.
The IP Guidelines state, however, that the mere existence of a license
in a horizontal context does not, by itself, constitute an antitrust
violation and that, conversely, a vertical relationship does not
guarantee the absence of competitive harm.ln In contrast to antitrust
cartel context." Kattan, supra note 149, at 11.
168. See IP Guidelines, supra note 7, § 2.3. Such exclusivity restrictions provide
further incentive for licensors to license by "protecting the licensor from competition
in the licensor's own technology in a market niche it prefers to keep to itself."
Kattan, supra note 149, at 11 (quoting the IP Guidelines).
169. See also IP Guidelines, supra note 7, § 3.1 (acknowledgig the typically
procompetitive impact of technology licensing).
170. See discussion supra notes 110-15 and accompanying text.
171. IP Guidelines, supra note 7, § 3.1 (emphasis added). In the explanatory
footnote, the Guidelines provide that "[a] firm will be treated as a likely potential
competitor if there is evidence that entry by that firm is reasonably probable in the
absence of the licensing arrangement." Id. at n.14. Indeed, this theme of harm to the
market gauged by comparison to competition that would have or likely might have
occurred but for the license is the basic premise of the Guidelines. See Ordover &
Willig, supra note 148, at 31-35 (reviewing the 1994 Draft version of the Guidelines in
terms of what they call the "But-For-The-License Competition" benchmark).
172. IP Guidelines, supra note 7, § 3.3. As previewed by the IP Guidelines,
licenses quite often are agreed to by parties whose relationships have both vertical
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regulation in the United States, authorities in the EU do not
differentiate between horizontal and vertical licenses."
The Agencies are also on guard for situations in which it appears
that licensing agreements have the effect of "dividing the markets
among firms that would have competed using different
technologies."'74  Yet another specific area of concern involves
arrangements that, in effect, merge the research and development
(R&D) activities of two of only a few firms capable of conducting
such R&D in a relevant field, thereby harming competition for the
development of new goods and services.'" As a corollary, the
Agencies will also remain vigilant with respect to acquisitions of
intellectual property rights, which may lessen competition in a
relevant market.7 6 Section 3.1 also includes such classic concerns as
agreements that "facilitate market division" or those that abet price-
fixing." Emphasis is also directed toward licenses perpetrating harm
to upstream or downstream markets and aftermarketsY
Inasmuch as an essential component of antitrust analysis involves
definition of the relevant market affected by the intellectual property
license, section 3.2 describes three discrete categories of markets
integral to the Agencies' review.'7 First, subsection 3.2.1 outlines the
traditional goods markets, including markets for final or intermediate
goods and upstream markets for goods used as inputs."' Second,
under situations in which the rights to intellectual property are
and horizontal features. For two diverging interpretations of three recent key cases
involving the vertical-horizontal duality (Bayer r. S.C. Johnson, United States r.
Microsoft Corp. and United States v. Pilkington), see Gilbert, supra note 149, at 9-10;
Taylor, supra note 149, at 23-27. See also Kattan, supra note 149, at 12-14.
173. See, e.g., Guttuso, supra note SO, at 242 ("To date, the block exemption
system has not made a distinction between vertical and horizontal licenses.").




178. Id. (emphasizing whether such effects be the result of "anticompetitively
foreclosing access to, or significantly raising the price of an important input, or by
facilitating coordination to increase price or reduce output." (citations omitted)).
179. See generally Kattan, supra note 149, at 11-12.
180. IP Guidelines, supra note 7, § 3.2.1. This subsection indicates that the Section
1 of the 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines (U.S. Department of Justice and Federal
Trade Commission Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Apr. 2, 1992)) generally will be
used to determine both the relevant goods market as well as the market share
thereof.
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licensed separately from the underlying products, the IT Guidelines
resolve that the appropriate antitrust assessment is based on the
technology market as outlined in subsection 3.2.2. This technology
market description embraces both "the intellectual property that is
licensed (the 'licensed technology') and its close substilutes-that is,
the technologies or goods that are close enough substitutes
significantly to constrain the exercise of market power with respect to
the intellectual property that is licensed....
However, it is the third type of market, the innovation market,
which has proven to be the most controversial." As described in
section 3.2.3, "[a]n innovation market consists of the research and
development directed to particular new or improved goods or
processes, and the close substitutes for that research and
development. '' "n The raison d'etre behind the innovation market
classification is the need to provide an analytical tool for evaluating
harm to innovation "that cannot be adequately addressed through the
analysis of goods or technology markets."1 " Thus, whein confronted
with licenses that may impact R&D competitors' efforts to develop
new or improved goods and/or services, the Agencies may elect to
assess the impact either as a separate competitive effect in relevant
goods or technology markets or as a competitive effect in a separate
181. IP Guidelines, supra note 7, § 3.2.2.
182. Id. § 3.2.3. However, the concept of an innovation market is not a new
feature of the 1995 IP Guidelines, having "debuted" in Case 6 of the 198$ Guidelines,
supra note 146.
183. IP Guidelines, supra note 7, § 3.2.3. According to this subsection, "close
substitutes are research and development efforts, technologies, and goods that
significantly constrain the exercise of market power with respect to the relevant
research and development, for example by limiting the ability and incentive of a
hypothetical monopolist to retard the pace of research and development."
184. Id. § 3.2.3. See, e.g., United States v. General Motors Corp., Civ. No. 93-530
(D. Del. filed Nov. 16, 1993). Here, the DOJ challenged the proposed acquisition of
the Allison division of General Motors by Z.F. Friedrichshafen on the grounds that it
would seriously effect the innovation market for the developmen of new and/or
improved heavy-duty vehicle transmissions by reducing the number of firms capable
and likely to engage in such R&D from three to two. As Richard Gilbert observed:
The innovation market was necessary to address likely significant
competitive effects in the development of new transmission models for sale
by General Motors in U.S. markets where ZF did not compete and was not
likely to compete. The effects of this innovation competition could not be
adequately addressed as price or output effects in relevant U.S. markets ....
Gilbert, supra note 149, at 7.
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innovation market.' However, the Agencies specify that they "will
delineate an innovation market only when the capabilities to engage
in the relevant research and development can be associated with
specialized assets or characteristics of specific firms."'
3. Section 3.4: Framevork for Evaluating License Restrictions
("Quick Look")
While admittedly the "vast majority" of cases scrutinized by the
Agencies will be subject to a rule of reason analysis, section 3A
outlines the factors considered in determining whether rule of reason
or per se illegality is the appropriate standard of review. Section 3.4
specifically enumerates acts that are traditionally deemed per se
unlawful, such as "naked price fixing, output restraints, and market
division among horizontal competitors, as well as certain group
boycotts and resale price maintenance.'.. However, with the
exception of resale price maintenance obligations, - the Agencies wll
not automatically condemn such provisions as per se antitrust
violations.1 ' Instead, the Agencies will first evaluate whether a
particular licensing restriction "can be expected to contribute to an
efficiency-enhancing integration of economic activity."'" 1
At this juncture, the per se rule will apply if: 1) "there is no
efficiency-enhancing integration of economic activity"; and 2) the
restriction is of the type traditionally labeled per se unlavful.'_
Conversely, for those licensing agreements that are deemed
procompetitive and are not exempt from challenge by means of the
twenty percent safe harbor of section 4.3, the Agencies shall then
conduct a rule of reason balancing. The "general approach" in
185. See Gilbert, supra note 149, at 7-8. As reported by Richard Gilbert, -When
an arrangement may affect the price or output of existing products and also the
development of similar improved products, the Agencies may challenge the
arrangement and allege an anticompetitive effect on innovation, without introducing
a separate innovation market, as the Department of Justice did in Flo;v
InternationaL" I& at 8 (citing United States v. Flow Int'l Corp., Civ. Action No. 94-
71320 (E.D. Mich. filed Apr. 4,1994)).
186. IP Guidelines, supra note 7, § 3.2.3 (emphasis added).
187. Id. § 3.4.
188. Id. § 5.2.
189. Id. § 3.4. See e.g., WILLIAM HOLms, ANTrrRUST LAW HANDBOOK S3 (1 6).
190. IP Guidelines, supra note 7, § 3A.
190. Id.
191. Id.
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employing this rule of reason analysis is to " inquire whether the
restraint is likely to have anticompetitive effects and, if so, whether
the restraint is reasonably necessary to achieve procompetitive
benefits that outweigh those anticompetitive effects."1"
It is at this stage of the Agencies' review that one of the more
salient features of the IP Guidelines comes into play. Recognizing
that a full-blown rule of reason evaluation requires a "comprehensive
inquiry into market conditions," the Agencies have come to
understand that there are circumstances where only an abbreviated
examination is needed to determine whether the Agencies should
challenge a restraint. Consequently, the IP Guideline:; provide for a
"truncated inquiry," colloquially known as the "quick look" analysis:
If the Agencies conclude that a restraint has no likely
anticompetitive effect, they will treat it as reasonable, without an
elaborate analysis of market power or the justification for the
restraint. Similarly, if a restraint facially appears to be of a kind
that would always or almost always tend to reduce output or
increase prices, and the restraint is not reasonably related to
efficiencies, the Agencies will likely challenge the restraint without
an elaborate analysis of particular industry circumstance.;.
193
Somewhat curiously, footnote 27 states that the FTC approach to
the truncated rule of reason inquiry is detailed in In re Massachusetts
Board of Registration in Optometry, 110 FTC 549, 604 (1988). In
contrast to the DOJ method of analyzing a potential challenge by
asking whether "a restraint facially appears to be of a km'nd that would
always or almost always tend to reduce output or increase prices," the
FTC will employ a separate analytical standard-the "inherently
suspect" restraints-to take a "quick look" at potentially
anticompetitive restrictions that "may be relatively unfamiliar or may
not fit neatly into traditional per se categories."' 94 As explained in
footnote 28, "[u]nder the FTC's Mass. Board approach, asserted
efficiency justifications for inherently suspect restraints are examined
to determine whether they are plausible and, if so, whether they are
192. Id. (citations omitted).
193. Id. (citations omitted). See generally HOLMtES, supra note 189, at 83-84;
Kattan, supra note 149, at 12.
194. IP Guidelines, supra note 7, § 3.4 n.27. Cf. § 4.3 & n.30 (defining facially
anticompetitive).
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valid in the context of the market at issue." ' 9
Although it seems more flexible than the traditional standard,
the IP Guidelines fail to give insight into the types of restraints
embraced by the "inherently suspect" category, nor do they give
reasons for this divergence in terminology regarding the "quick look"
procedure. Furthermore, they do not state whether the net impact of
this divergence is more than a matter of syntax. On its face, this dual
quick look framework erodes the predictability of an otherwise
laudable addition to the 1995 IP Guidelines.' Nonetheless, just as in
the case of the new accelerated opposition procedure under
Regulation 240196 (the EU equivalent of the "quick look"), for the
most part, interested parties should benefit from a faster and less
formalistic review of licensing agreements.Y
4. Section 4: Rule of Reason Analysis
While section 3 sets forth the framework for analytical review,
section 4 outlines the rule of reason methodology for evaluating
restrictions that escaped per se condemnation because they are not
"facially anticompetitive" or "inherently suspect."" However, before
delving into the rule of reason's comprehensive market inquiry and
balancing pro and anticompetitive effects, one should first assess
whether the licensing arrangement at issue qualifies for the twenty
percent "safety zone" in section 4.3.
195. IP Guidelines, supra note 7, § 3.4 n.28 (citing Mass. Bd. of Registration in
Optometry, 110 F.T.C. 549,604 (1988)).
196. Discerning some of the disadvantages resulting from the FTC approach,
Joseph Kattan wrote:
Under [the Massachusetts Board of Optometry] approach, the FTC
condemns without a detailed competitive analysis restraints that are
traditionally analyzed under the rule of reason but that the FTC determines
to be 'inherently suspect' and lacldng efficiency justifications. If used to
analyze intellectual property licenses, this approach would relieve the FC
of the burden of establishing anticompetitive effects resulting from a
licensing arrangement whenever the FTC decides that a license provision is
'inherently suspect.' Instead, the licensor would bear the burden of
demonstrating that the license provision promotes efficiency. The potential
use of this approach by the FTC introduces substantial uncertainty to the
antitrust analysis in view of the inherent elasticity of the 'inherently susp.ct'
classification.
Kattan, supra note 149, at 12.
197. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
198. IP Guidelines, supra note 7, §§ 3.4,4.3.
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a. Subsection 4.3: The Antitrust "Safety Zone"
As the IP Guidelines explain, "The safety zone is designed to
provide owners of intellectual property with a degree of certainty in
those situations in which anticompetitive effects are so unlikely that
the arrangements may be presumed not to be anticompetitive without
an inquiry into particular industry circumstances. '"" Note, however,
that the safety zone is not applicable to acquisitions (sales) and sole
exclusive licenses of intellectual property, as specified in subsection
5.7, footnote 37.
"Absent extraordinary circumstances" licensing agreements that
meet the two-pronged test for "automatic exemption" under
subsection 4.3 avoid a rule of reason analysis. There is a "general"
version as well as adapted versions for situations involving technology
or innovation markets and insufficient or inconclusive market share
data.20 Common to all three situations is the requirement that "the
restraint is not facially anticompetitive." ' 1  Where market share
information is available and "accurately represents; competitive
significance," the second prong of the general test reqtdres that "the
licensor and its licensees collectively account for no more than twenty
percent of each relevant market significantly affected by the
restraint."2Z02
199. Id. § 4.3.
200. Id.
201. Id. William C. Holmes brings attention to the fact that the term "facially
anticompetitive" in the final version of the 1995 IP Guidelines was not originally in
the 1994 draft version, which instead more specifically stated that the restraint not be
"of a type that normally warrants condemnation under the per se rule." Holmes
astutely questioned the impact of this less defined standard on the predictability and
certainty of the safety zone, asking "whether the change in phrasing is meant to
suggest that conduct that is not viewed as per se illegal might nevertieless be seen as
'facially anticompetitive' and, hence, as falling outside of the 20 percent 'safe
harbor."' HOLMES, supra note 189, at 84. It is therefore quite interesting to observe
that note 30 of the final version of the 1995 IP Guidelines reincorporates the 1994
draft wording as follows: "'Facially anticompetitive' refers to restraints that normally
warrant per se treatment, as well as other restraints of a kind that would always or
almost always tend to reduce output or increase prices. See section 3.4."
202. IP Guidelines, supra note 7, § 4.3. (emphasis added). Note that compliance
with safety zone parameters will be assessed "by reference only to goods markets
unless the analysis of goods markets alone would inadequately address the effects of
the licensing arrangement on competition among technologies or research and
development." Id. (emphasis added). It should also be observed that the safety zone
does not apply to transactions in which a merger analysis is applied, namely
transactions involving acquisitions of intellectual property as dealt with under section
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Thus, while under some circumstances those affected by licensing
agreements "on the edge" may consider it useful to include
prophylactic provisions regarding the twenty percent collective
market share, the consequences of exceeding the IP Guidelines safety
zone limit are not nearly as serious as when the licensee's market
share meets or exceeds forty percent within the EU.2Y In fact,
subsection 4.3 clearly states that "licensing arrangements are not
anticompetitive merely because they do not fall within the scope of
the safety zone. Indeed, it is likely that the great majority of licenses
falling outside the safety zone are lawful and pro-competitive. ' "
Therefore, the fact that a particular licensing arrangement may "grow
out from under" the safety zone due to an increase in collective
market share is not great cause for concern.-"Y
When analyzing technology markets or situations where there is
insufficient or inconclusive market share data, the Agencies will look
to the concentration of the market and whether the technology
concerned faces significant competition. In such cases, the Agencies
will ask whether "there are four or more independently controlled
technologies in addition to the technologies controlled by the parties
to the licensing arrangement that may be substitutable for the
licensed technology at a comparable cost."" Similarly, with regards
to innovation markets, the Agencies will examine whether:
four or more independently controlled entities in addition to the
parties to the license to the licensing arrangement possess the
required specialized assets or characteristics and the incentive to
engage in research and development that is a close substitute of the
research and development activities of the parties to the licensing
arrangement' 7
As was the case with the rejected market share thresholds in EU
5.7.
203. See supra notes 130-42 and accompanying text. Recall that in this instance
the European Commission can withdraw the benefit of the Regulation 24096 block
exemption, which in turn will render void the licensing agreement at issue, due to the
"sanction of nullity" under article 85(2), unless an individual exemption is obtained
or national law permits the severance of the offending clause. Accordingly, ithin
the EU, contention, or even genuine mistake, regarding market share calculations
can have dramatic consequences. See Davis & Johnston, supra note 85, at 16.
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Regulation 240/96, criticism was levied at the difficulties parties faced
in measuring collective market shares, even in standard product
markets, to calculate eligibility for the safety zone."" Unlike the
European Commission, however, the Agencies apparently were not
swayed by such criticism, which comes as no surprise since the
immediate consequences of falling outside the safety zone are
minimal compared to exceeding the proposed market share
thresholds in the EU.2" The safety zone, therefore, should provide at
least a degree of welcome predictability for a great number of
licensing arrangements.
b. Subsection 4.1: The Rule of Reason-Step One: Analysis of
Anticompetitive Effects, Market Structure, Coordination and
Foreclosure
Intellectual property licenses that are neither condemned as per
se illegal nor exonerated by means of the twenty-percent safety zone
are subject to the traditional three step rule of reason analysis. As
discussed above in connection with subsection 3.4, the first step of the
rule of reason analysis is to "inquire whether the restraint is likely to
have anticompetitive effects."' 0 Subsection 4.1.1 outlines the factors
to be considered in estimating the anticompetitive effects of licenses,
particularly emphasizing whether the parties to the restriction have a
horizontal relationship or the license itself has horizontal effects!"
208. See, e.g., Ordover & Willig, supra note 148, at 32 (advocating the EU block
exemption-type approach and specifying "a list of 'Yes-Yesses' of licensing
arrangements that, absent delimited extraordinary circumstances, would be free of a
risk of challenge.").
209. See supra note 203. As discussed above, failure to meet the proposed EU
market share thresholds would cause a licensing agreement to b- ineligible for
automatic exemptions under Regulation 240/96, thereby necessitating individual
notification and approval in order that the license be valid and enforceable. If the
thresholds in Regulation 240/96 were retained, then miscalculations erring on the low
side could have dire consequences. In contrast, there are no automatic consequences
for exceeding the safety zone's twenty percent limit. Indeed, subsection 4.3 states
that "it is not intended to suggest that parties should conform to the safety zone or to
discourage parties falling outside the safety zone from adopting restrictions that are
reasonably necessary to achieve an efficiency-enhancing integration of economic
activity." IP Guidelines, supra note 7, § 4.3.
210. IP Guidelines, supra note 7, § 3.4; see supra notes 187-97 and accompanying
text.
211. As Kattan remarked:
The IP Guidelines for the most part adopt a more permissive approach
toward vertical agreements, the category into which most intellectual
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Market structure conditions, such as degree of concentration, entry
barriers, price elasticity, proportion of market affected by the license
and the duration of the license are then reviewed in light of identified
anticompetitive behavior risks, such as coordination of pricing,
reduction of output, acquisition or maintenance of market power.""
In conjunction with vertical restraints, identified harms also
include foreclosing access to or raising costs of important inputs:
Furthermore, the Agencies are alert to patterns of similar restrictions
between different licensors and their respective licensees within a
relevant market, since such purposeful behavior can facilitate pricing
coordination. Nevertheless, the IP Guidelines also explicitly
acknowledge that "[t]he use of similar restraints may be common and
procompetitive in an industry, however, because they contribute to
efficient exploitation of the licensed property."""
c. Subsection 4.1.2: Licensing Arrangements Involving
Exclusivity
Subsection 4.1.2, in turn, guides the examination of
anticompetitive effects posed by de facto or de jure exclusivity
restrictions within intellectual property licenses. Clearly, given a non-
exclusive license that contains no proscriptions on the competitive
behavior of either party to the license, even in the context of a
horizontal relationship, the Agencies will almost never have cause to
challenge such a license. L Rather, the IP Guidelines here are
concerned with exclusivity in two respects. First, exclusive licenses,
including those that proscribe the licensor itself from exploiting the
intellectual property rights, may limit or even reduce the number of
competitors with access to the licensed intellectual property. The
second form of exclusivity, exclusive dealing, whether explicit or
property licenses fall. Just as vertical non-price restraints in other contexts
rarely raise competitive concerns in the post-Sylvania era, the IP Guidelines
largely presume that restrictions in vertical licenses seldom have the capacity
to harm competition.
Kattan, supra note 149, at 12 (footnotes omitted).
212. IP Guidelines, supra note 7, § 4.1.1.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. § 4.1.2 ("[T]he non-exclusive license normally does not diminish
competition that would occur in its absence."). In fact, non-exclusive licenses serve
to augment competition by increasing the number of parties entitled to exploit the
licensed intellectual property right.
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implied, occurs when the licensee is prohibited from "licensing,
selling, distributing, or using competing technologies. ',1 6 As
developed in more detail in subsections 5.1 and 5.4 through 5.7,
exclusivity restrictions, viewed against a backdrop of market
concentration or horizontal competitors, elicit heightened caution and
scrutiny by the Agencies. On the other hand, the IP Guidelines are
frank in confirming that exclusivity restrictions may also induce
procompetitive effects, and moreover, because of the easily
misappropriated nature of intellectual property rights, they may in
fact be justified.17
Comparing the policy behind the EU approach to this critical
issue of exclusivity and technology is instructive. Licenses that
restrict a party from competing "in respect of research and
development, production, use or distribution of competing products,"
except as provided in article 2(1)(17) and (18), are explicitly included
on the Black List of article 3 in Regulation 240/96.21 ' According to
Sebastiano Guttuso, the EC Commission's position seems more
liberal than that of the IP Guidelines, although "the difference here is
more apparent than real."2 9 Guttuso attributes the difference in the
U.S. approach to the Agencies' concern "not only about restrictions
on goods or technologies other than the licensed technology but also
216. Id. The IP Guidelines here reiterate the position that "actual practice and its
effects" and not form that will underlie the Agencies' investigations. Thus, even
licenses expressly labeled non-exclusive may in effect pose the same concerns as
licenses with definitive exclusivity restrictions.
217. "Generally, an exclusive license may raise antitrust conc:rns only if the
licensees themselves or the licensor and its licensees are in a horizontal relationship."
Id. (emphasis added). Moreover, subsection 4.1.2 states plainly that just because "a
party chooses to deal with a single licensee or licensor, or confines his activity to a
single field of use or location, or because only a single licensee has chosen to take a
license," the Agencies will not automatically presuppose a violation. [d.
218. Commission Regulation 240/96, supra note 90, at art. 3(2). However, the
article 2(1)(18) exception rather emasculates the article 3(2) position by allowing:
a reservation by the licensor of the right to terminate the exclusivity granted
to the licensee and to stop licensing improvements to him when the licensee
enters into competition within the common market with the licensor, with
undertakings connected with the licensor or with other undertakings in
respect of research and development, production, use or distribution of
competing products, and to require the licensee to prove that the licensed
know-how is not being used for the production of products and the provision
of services other than those licensed.
Id. at art. 2(1)(18).
219. Guttuso, supra note 80, at 242.
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license provisions that deter licensees from dealing with suppliers or
products that compete with those of the licensor.'2'
d Subsection 4.2: The Rule of Reason-Steps Two and Three:
Efficiencies and Justifications
Once the Agencies conclude, under the rule of reason, that a
restraint "has, or is likely to have, an anticompetitive effect," the
Agencies will then "consider whether the restraint is reasonably
necessary to achieve procompetitive efficiencies."' When appraising
reasonable necessity, the Agencies need not consider whether that
restraint is the least restrictive possible.' Still, the availability of a
"practical and significantly less restrictive alternative" provision will
reflect negatively in the Agencies' finding. "If it is clear that the
parties could have achieved similar efficiencies by means that are
significantly less restrictive, then the Agencies VilU not give weight to
the parties' efficiency claim." ' In assessing reasonable necessity,
particular emphasis will be given to the duration of the restraint, and
whether it "clearly exceeds the period needed to achieve the
procompetitive efficiency. ' '14 Of course, all factors, including
duration, must be examined in view of the circumstances of the
relevant market. Thus, a restraint may be reasonably necessary to
achieve procompetitive efficiencies given a particular market with, for
example, high entry barriers, whereas the same restraint might be
unreasonable with respect to a different market."
Assuming a restraint passed the "reasonably necessary" hurdle,
the Agencies will proceed to the third step of the traditional rule of
reason analysis in which they "balance the procompetitive efficiencies
and the anticompetitive effects to determine the probable net effect
220. Id.
221. IP Guidelines, supra note 7, § 4.2.
222. See Gilbert, supra note 149, at 7 (The antitrust laws in general, and the IP
Guidelines in particular "are not generally concerned with whether an arrangement
that creates competition or is competitively neutral could have been constructed in a
manner to make it even more beneficial."); see also Kattan, supra note 149, at 11
("[I]t is irrelevant than [sic] alternative licensing agreement could have created even
more competition that the arrangement that the parties chose.").
223. IP Guidelines, supra note 7, § 4.2. However, the Agencies "will not attempt
to draw fine distinctions regarding duration. .. ." Id.
224. 1d.
225. Id.
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on competition in each relevant market.""2 6 The balancing test is, in
fact, more of a sliding scale, for "[a]s the expected anticompetitive
effects in a particular licensing arrangement increase, the Agencies
will require evidence establishing a greater level of expected
efficiencies.""
5. Section 5: Application of General Principles
Although stating the obvious, the rule of reason balancing test is
clearly a "qualitative one," calling for a case by case review of the
individualized factors surrounding each license. Nevertheless, the
Agencies also recognize that certain licensing situations, particularly
those with horizontal aspects and/or involving firms with market
power, are more prone to competitive abuse. Accordingly, section 5
focuses on particular considerations regarding some of these
"suspect" types of agreements.
a. Subsection 5.1: Horizontal Restraints
Subsection 5.1 recaps the Agencies' position, repeated
throughout the IP Guidelines, that licensing arrangements with
horizontal effects are not necessarily violative of antitrust laws simply
due to their horizontal nature, and in some instances they can actually
create integrative efficiencies resulting from "the realization of
economies of scale and the integration of complementary research
and development, production, and marketing capabilities.""
Procompetitive potential notwithstanding, this subsection also
emphasizes the classic abuses in the horizontal context that will
receive short shrift as per se illegal restraints of trade-namely, price
fixing, allocation of markets or customers, agreements to reduce
output and certain group boycotts.
b. Subsection5.3: Tying Arrangements
Although tying arrangements were formerly one of the per se
illegal Nine No-Nos, subsection 5.3 reveals that while tying can be
anticompetitive in effect, such a result should not be presumed due to
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. §5.1; see id. §§ 3.1, 3.3, 4.1.1, 4.1.2. See example 9 of section 5.1,
illustrating how joint marketing through a joint venture of two competing patent
rights constitutes per se illegal horizontal price fixing.
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the potential procompetitive benefits and efficiencies that can be
effected through tying arrangements. Package licensing, in which a
single agreement (or related series of agreements) covers multiple
intellectual property fights, may be a species of tying if the grant of
the license for one intellectual property right is predicated on the
acceptance of another intellectual property right not necessary for the
exploitation of the first right. The traditional rule of reason balancing
of competitive pros and cons will apply with regard to tying and
package licenses. Thus, "[t]he Agencies would be likely to challenge
a tying arrangement if: (1) the seller has market power in the tying
product; (2) the arrangement has an adverse effect on competition in
the relevant market for the tied product; and (3) efficiency
justifications for the arrangement do not outweigh the
anticompetitive effects." '
Note that since the EU moved tying arrangements from the
Black List of the technology transfer block exemption to the Grey
List of items requiring individual review by the Commission, there is
now considerable convergence with regard to U.S. and EU treatment
of tying provisions.
c. Subsection 5.4: Exclusive Dealing
As discussed above, subsection 4.1.2 describes the possible
benefits and injuries to competition connected vith exclusivity
restrictions in intellectual property licenses. Subsection 5.4 outlines
considerations that the Agencies will take into account when
evaluating the net impact of such licenses. The anticompetitive
effects are specifically related to factors such as the degree of
foreclosure of the relevant market, the duration of the agreement and
other constraints on competition among competing technologies.
They are also related to issues of input and output markets, such as
market concentration, entry barriers and price elasticity." If an
exclusive dealing restraint is found to have actual or likely
anticompetitive effects, the Agencies will weigh any offsetting
benefits of the license, such as incentives to either licensors or
licensees to develop, refine and market the licensed technology or
229. Id. § 5.3; see also Kattan, supra note 149, at 14.
230. IP Guidelines, supra note 7, § 5.3 (footnote omitted).
231. Id.§ 5.4.
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other competition stimulating effects.'
d. Subsection 5.5: Cross-Licensing and Pooling Arrangements
Cross-licensing and pooling arrangements run the gamut from
per se illegal "mechanisms to accomplish naked price fixing or market
division" to borderline collective price or output restraints, which
must be ruled "efficiency-enhancing" to be legal; to arrangements
that "provide pro-competitive benefits by integrating complementary
technologies, reducing transaction costs, clearing blocking positions,
and avoiding costly infringement litigation. ' '"3 Indeed, subsection 5.5
reflects that cross-licensing settlements can be an efficient means of
avoiding costly and protracted infringement litigation and generally
are favored by courts.24
Despite the potential for benefit through cross-licenses and
pooling arrangements, the Agencies remain watchful for possible
negative effects on relevant markets. For example, with cross-
licensing settlements, the Agencies will review whether the net effect
is to "diminish competition among entities that would have been
actual or likely potential competitors in a relevant market in the
absence of the cross-license. '" 23 The Agencies may also intervene
when a firm excluded from a pooling or cross-licensing arrangement
cannot compete effectively in the relevant market and the pool
participants collectively possess market power in that market.3 6
Another primary concern is whether pooling arrangements may have
a dampening effect on innovation as a result of the participants being
deterred or discouraged from engaging in research and development.
However, this is only likely when the pooling agreement represents a
high percentage of the research and development capability within
the relevant innovation market.27
232. See discussion of vertical non-price restraints infra notes 248-337 and
accompanying text.




237. According to the FTC Staff Report:
[O]verbroad patent protection, especially in the area of biotechnology, may
increase the need for cross-licensing arrangements and thereby increase the
competitive dangers associated with patent pooling. Under this view, where
incremental research is important, but the patents are broad and basic, cross-
licensing is potentially anticompetitive and may choke future innovation.
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e. Subsection 5.6: Grantbacks
Grantbacks are obligations on the licensee to license back to the
licensor those improvements the licensee made to the licensed
intellectual property. These grantbacks can have procompetitive and
anticompetitive effects under conditions in a relevant market.
Grantbacks, in general, may benefit the market by promoting
innovation, allowing licensor and licensee to share risks and providing
incentives to disseminate the original licensed intellectual property
and improvements thereto. Conversely, competition to innovate
suffers when the grantback serves to substantially reduce a licensee's
incentive to engage in research and development efforts.
Not surprisingly, non-exclusive grantbacks, in which the licensee
is free to license its improvements to third parties, are unlikely to
raise a challenge from the Agencies. In addition, even if a grantback
obligation is deemed likely to reduce a licensee's innovation
incentive, the Agencies will still consider whether the grantback
provides certain benefits under the agreement, "such as (1)
promoting dissemination of licensee's improvements to the licensed
technology, (2) increasing the licensor's incentives to disseminate the
licensed technology, or (3) otherwise increasing competition and
output in a relevant technology or innovation market."' ; Plainly, a
key consideration in a rule of reason analysis of grantbacks is the
licensor's market power. However, the Agencies will also take into
account the extent to which grantbacks "generally increase licensors'
incentives to innovate in the first place."'"
The U.S. approach to grantbacks is notably less categorical than
that of the EU, which blacklists outright exclusive grantback
restrictions."0 In fact, article 2 of EU Regulation 240196 permits the
inclusion of grantback obligations in licenses only when the
restrictions are reciprocal, i.e., non-exclusive on the licensee,
exclusive or non-exclusive on the licensor."1 Nonetheless, the EC
FIC Staff Report, supra note 4, at S-7S. The Report urges cooperation b.tveen the
FTC and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office and others to adapt policy
concerning the problems created by overbroad patents. The Report also emphasizes
that the FTC should continue in its efforts to challenge cross-licensing arrangements
that lack ample efficiency justifications.
238. IP Guidelines, supra note 7, § 5.6.
239. Id.
240. Commission Regulation 240196, supra note 90, at art. 3(6).
241. Id. at art. 2()(4).
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Commission's recognition of the procompetitive justifications for
reciprocal grantbacks is essentially the same as that set forth in
subsection 5.6 of the IP Guidelines.242
f. Subsection 5.7: Acquisitions of Intellectual Property Rights
The Agencies determined that "outright sales" of intellectual
property rights, as well as certain exclusive licenses, are most
appropriately reviewed by applying a merger analysis.2 3 Exclusive
licenses under which all other persons, including the licensor, are
prohibited from exploiting the licensed intellectual property,
tantamount to a sale, are viewed in the same light as intellectual
property acquisitions.' Consequently, subsection 5.7 of the IP
Guidelines requires that the principles and standards of merger
analysis, specifically those set forth in the 1992 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, be employed when the Agencies examine these licenses."'
This approach is consistent with the general principle of the 1995 IP
Guidelines which states that intellectual property be viewed in the
antitrust setting "as essentially comparable to any other form of
property"24 and that the Agencies "apply the same general antitrust
principles to conduct involving intellectual property that they apply to
conduct involving any other form of tangible or intangible
property."2 "
II. Vertical Restraints: Differing Approaches to a
Fundamental Concern
Although vertical restrictions (sometimes called distribution
restraints when connected with product movement) are routinely
included in intellectual property licenses, their effect on competition,
including territorial and/or customer restrictions, exclusive dealing,
242. See, e.g., Guttuso, supra note 80, at 241 (emphasizing similarities of EU and
U.S. rationale behind grantbacks).
243. IP Guidelines, supra note 7, § 5.7.
244. Id.; see also Clayton Act § 7A(a)(3)(B), 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27; 16 C.F.R. § 801.10
(1998). Note also that exclusive licenses valued at $10 million or more and are
contributed to an incorporated joint venture are subject to premerger notification
filing requirements. 16 C.F.R. § 801.40.
245. IP Guidelines, supra note 7, § 5.7; see also U.S. Dep't of Justize & Fed. Trade
Comm'n, 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 (1992).
246. IP Guidelines, supra note 7, § 2.0(a).
247. Id. § 2.1.
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location agreements, image advertising requirements and trans-
shipping restrictions, continues to be a hotly contested topic. One
author characterized the U.S. approach to vertical restraints as that of
"abrupt policy reversals of the DOJ" and flip-flopping of Supreme
Court decisions that "reflect an ongoing theoretical debate" over the
proper antitrust policy regarding vertical restraints." In noting a
recent marked increase in vertical restraint litigation, another
commentator noted that "[s]imultaneously, antitrust law analysts and
economists are both giving more attention to claims that vertical
restraints, and particularly non-price restraints, may be less than
beneficial notwithstanding the presence of interbrand competition.":"
Founded in both law and economic theory, criticism of the U.S.
judicial and administrative approach to vertical restraints is
widespread. For example, Judge Richard Posner described the
required balancing test for analyzing vertical restraints as "infeasible
and unsound, ' while Judge Frank Easterbrook used the term "snipe
hunt.""' Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court began reconsidering and
narrowing the rule against vertical price restraints. In State Oil
Company v. Khan,' the Court overruled thirty years' precedentC-
248. Warren S. Grimes, Brand Marketing, Intrabrand Competition and the
Multibrand Retailer: The Antitrust Law of Vertical Restraints, 64 ANT"RVSr L.J. 83,
85 (1995). In reviewving the policy upheavals pertaining to vertical restraints, Grimes
cites the issuance in 1985 and subsequent withdrawal in 1993 of the U.S. Department
of Justice Vertical Restraint Guidelines (1985), 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) , 13,105
(Aug. 17, 1993). See The Assistant Attorney General Anne K. Binnaman's Address to
the ABA Antitrust Section, 65 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 250 (Aug. 12,
1993) (withdrawal of Vertical Restraint Guidelines). Grimes also cited three U.S.
Supreme Court decisions between 1963 and 1977 in which, according to Grimes, "the
first declin[ed] to set a standard governing nonprice vertical restraints, the second
adopt[ed] a per se rule, and the third discard[ed] the per se rule and retumled] to a
rule of reason." Il (citing respectively White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S.
253 (1963); United States v. Arnold Schwinn & Co., 3'S U.S. 365 (1967); Continental
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977)).
249. Alan H. Silberman, Vertical Price, Customer and Territorial Limitations, in I
37TH ANNUAL ANTrrRUsT LAw INsTrrTTE 529 (William T. Lifland et al. co-chairs,
1996). See generally Grimes, supra note 248.
250. Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted
Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 6, 8 (1981).
251. Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of Reason, 53
ANTIrrrusT L-. 135, 155 (1984).
252. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997). For articles criticizing the earlier
rule, see, for example, Warren S. Grimes, The Seven Myths of Vertical Price FWring:
The Politics and Economics of a Century-Long Debate, 21 Sw. U. L REv. 12.35 11942)
(summarizing the historical, economic and political context influencing policy
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and held that "there is insufficient economic justification for per se
invalidation of vertical maximum price fixing."'  The Court,
however, did leave minimum vertical price fixing as per se illegal. 
5
A. Non-Price Vertical Restraints
Within the United States, the present controversy and confusion
regarding the "true" impact of non-price vertical restraints on
competition and their attendant policy considerations are traceable
directly to the 1977 landmark case, Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE
Sylvania, Inc.' 6  Sylvania is one of the most important antitrust
decisions since the Alcoa case of the mid-1940s and remains a
foundation for judicial decision and governmental policy, as well as
the source of legal and economic contention" Because of its
importance, both Sylvania and earlier cases are the subject of
extensive scholarly review and debate. It is not the purpose of this
Article, however, to dissect in detail this oft-examined case.'
Nonetheless, a brief look at the precepts of this pivotal Supreme
Court ruling is a useful platform for examining the vertical restraint
theories and arguments now extant.
regarding vertical price fixing); Charles E. Mueller, Bork/AMiller and the
Congressional Debate on RPM: A Reply from the L 0. Economists, ANTITRUST L. &
ECON. REv., 1989, at 87; Richard Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court. An
Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition
Decisions, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 282, 283-300 (1975); Richard M. Steuer, Vertical
Restraints in the Nineties, 62 ANTrrRusT L.J. 717 (1994) (reviewing cales to determine
what does and does not constitute resale price maintenance).
253. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
254. State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. at 283.
255. Id.
256. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
257. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cix. 1945) (opining
on the definition of market share).
258. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 36. See, e.g., Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan,
Antitrust-Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We Coming From? Where Are
We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 936 (1987); Ernest Gelhorn & Teresa Tatham,
Making Sense Out of the Rule of Reason, 35 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 155 (1984-1985);
Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 925
(1979); Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach:
Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CH. L. REv. 1 (1977) [hereinafter Posner,
Reflections on Sylvania]; William S. Stewart & Barry S. Roberts, Viability of the
Antitrust Per Se Illegality Rule: Schwinn Down, How Many to Go?, 58 WASH. U. L.Q,
727 (1980).
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1. Sylvania- The Facts
Prior to 1962, GTE Sylvania, Inc., having slumped to a national
market share of only one to two percent, decided to completely
overhaul its product distribution network?' After first phasing out its
wholesale distributors, Sylvania began selling directly to a smaller,
more select group of franchised retailers. ' In order to attract more
competent and aggressive retailers, Sylvania limited the number of
franchises within a geographic area and included location restrictions
in its franchise agreements. :6 Sylvania retained sole discretion to
increase the number of franchisees within an area.::2 When denied
permission to open a second store within an area already being served
by another franchisee, a disgruntled franchisee, Continental T.V.,
Inc., filed suit claiming that the vertical location restriction imposed
by Sylvania was a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.: -
2. Sylvania-The Court's Opinion
Overruling the per se illegal approach to vertical restraints as
mandated by the widely denounced Schwinn case then in effect,
Justice Powell, writing the opinion in Sylvania, instead decreed a
"return to the rule of reason that governed vertical restriction prior to
Schwinn.":  While acknowledging that, as a result of vertical
259. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 38.
260. Id.
261. Id. Although at the district court level Sylvania claimed that it acted
unilaterally in its location decision, before the U.S. Supreme Court Sylvania
conceded that the location restrictions involved understandings or agreements vith
the franchisees. Id. at 40 n.8.
262. Id. at 38.
263. Id. at 39-40.
264. Id. at 59. Justice Powell reasoned that, since "there had been no showing in
this case, either generally or wvith respect to Sylvania's agreements, that vertical
restraints have or are likely to have a 'pernicious effect on competition' or that they
'lack ... any redeeming virtue.' as needed in order to support a finding of per se
illegality, then despite the sanctity of stare decisis, the Schirinn decision must
therefore be overruled. Id. at 57-58. It should further be noted that Powell left open
the possibility that regarding some vertical restraints the per se rule might be
appropriate, stating, "But we do make clear that departure from the rule-of-reason
standard must be based upon demonstrable economic effect rather than-as in
Schwinn-upon formalistic line drawing." Id. at 59; sec United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967) (setting what was in essence a partial per se test-
vertical restrictions on dovnline distributors were per se illegal, unless manufacturer
retained title, dominion and risk); see also Gelhor & Tatham, supra note 25, at 167-
68 (describing the immediate critical reaction against the Schinn decision). But see
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
restraints, intrabrand competition might be stifled or even eliminated
altogether, the Court nonetheless observed that "[v]ertical
restrictions promote interbrand competition by allowing the
manufacturer to achieve certain efficiencies in the distribution of his
products."2 5 Interbrand competition, as declared by Sylvania, is "the
primary concern of antitrust law." 6 Garnering support from the
Chicago school's producer-oriented perspective, the Court touted
licensee investment incentives and prevention of free-riding as
creating benefits that eventually accrue to consumers:
For example, new manufacturers and manufacturers entering new
markets can use the restrictions in order to induce competent and
aggressive retailers to make the kind of investment of capital and
labor that is often required in the distribution of products unknown
to the consumer. Established manufacturers can use them to
induce retailers to engage in promotional activities or to provide
services and repair facilities necessary to the efficient marketing of
their products.... Because of market imperfections such as the so-
called 'free rider' effect, these services might not be provided by
retailers in a purely competitive situation, despite the fact that each
retailer's benefit would be greater if all provided the services than if
none did.267
Thus, sacrificing intrabrand competition via vertical restraints
was seen as a mechanism for enabling "manufacturers... to compete
more effectively against other manufacturers."2 " As a result of such
heightened interbrand competition, consumers benefited from lower
costs, greater variety and better service.269
3. Sylvania- The Problems
In abandoning a blanket condemnation of vertical non-price
restraints, Justice Powell in Sylvania expressly reinstated the rule of
reason standard for antitrust analysis announced in Justice Brandeis'
Martin B. Louis, Vertical Distributional Restraints Under Schwinn and Sylvania: An
Argument for the Continuing Use of a Partial Per Se Approach, 75 MiCH. L. RIv. 275
(1976).
265. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 54.
266. Id. at 52 n.19.
267. Id. at 55 (citing, for support, Chicago School adherent Richard Posner).
268. Id. (citing Lee E. Preston, Restrictive Distribution Arrangements. Economic
Analysis and Public Policy Standards, 30 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 506,511 (1965)).
269. Posner, supra note 250.
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1918 opinion in Chicago Board of Trade v. United Statesr"3
subsequently reaffirmed in Northern Pacific Railway v. United States
and later reiterated by White Motor Co. v. United States."
Conspicuously absent from Powell's directive was any concrete
guidance as to the factors that should be considered or the weight to
be accorded to those factors when conducting a rule of reason
balancingr Criticism of Sylvania, as much for what was not said as
for what was, followed immediately and continues to the present day.
For example, as then-professor Richard Posner wryly remarked on
the heels of the Sylvania decision:
The content of the Rule of Reason is largely unknown; in practice,
it is little more than a euphemism for nonliability. The Court in
Sylvania may not have intended by its invocation of the Rule of
Reason to bless all restrictions in distribution, but it was deceived if
it thought it was subjecting those restrictions to scrutiny under a
well-understood legal standard.m
A few years later, then-professor Frank Easterbrook commented
somewhat scathingly:
[I]t is fantastic to suppose that judges and juries could make such an
evaluation (i.e., the balancing of effects on intrabrand versus
interbrand competition as required by the rule of reason). The
welfare implications of most forms of business conduct are beyond
our ken. If we assembled twelve economists and gave them all the
available data about a business practice, plus an unlimited
computer budget, we would not get agreement about whether the
practice promoted consumers' welfare or economic efficiency more
broadly defined.2 4
270. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36,49 (1977) (quoting
from Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918) a classic but rather
abstract description of the rule of reason rationale for balancing the banefits and
harms of restraints rather than denouncing them outright as per se illegal).
271. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 57 (citing Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1
(1958); White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963)).
272. See, e.g., Gelhorn & Tatham, supra note 258, at 169 ("[t]he opinion in
Sylvania provided little guidance for analyzing a manufacturer's nonprice vertical
restrictions.").
273. Posner, Reflections on Sylvania, supra note 258, at 14.
274. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitnst, 63 Ta-X. L. REv. 1, 11 (1984);
see also Douglas H. Ginsburg, Vertical Restraints: De Facto Legality Under the Rule of
Reason, 60 ANrrrnusT LJ. 67, 68 (1991) ("Courts, and indeed economists, are ill
equipped to carry out the Supreme Court's instructions to balance the conflicting
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Subsequent Supreme Court decisions such as Monsanto,
Jefferson Parish 1 6 and Sharp Electronics shed no further light on the
details of balancing intrabrand and interbrand effects resulting from
vertical restraints.
Accordingly, it is left to the lower courts and antitrust
enforcement agencies to fill in, or in some situations dodge, the
"gaps" left by the Sylvania opinion. As one author commented, "It
should come as no surprise that this prescription may be difficult to
apply amidst the swirl of conflicting economic arguments and
intensive fact patterns that characterize antitrust litigation.""
Nevertheless, courts, enforcement agencies and licensing parties do
not have the luxury of academic debate "when faced with vague
directive[s] concerning a theory of great complexity" coupled with
limited time and finite resources. As a result, they developed
practical, if imperfect, responses to vertical licensing restrictions
challenges. ' 9 The gaps or difficulties thus engendered by the Sylvania
effects that economic theory attributes to vertical restraints, much less to determine
whether the net result of a particular restraint is on balance to impede or to 'promote
... competition."').
275. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984). In this vertical
price fixing case, which set an important yet controversial precedent regarding
evidence of price fixing, conspiracy and dealer termination, the U.S. Supreme Court
directed only that, in distinguishing concerted action to set prices from concerted
action on nonprice restrictions, "[t]he latter are judged under thc rule of reason,
which requires a weighing of the relevant circumstances of a case to decide whether a
restrictive practice constitutes an unreasonable restraint on competition." Id. at 761
(citing Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36 (1977)).
276. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984). In this seminal
tying case, the Court held that per se condemnation of tie-ins is raserved only for
those situations in which the party imposing the tie has market power. Writing the
concurring opinion for four of the Justices, Justice O'Connor urged the Court to
adopt the rule of reason approach to tie-ins and find tying anticompetitive only when
the seller, with market power in the tying product, could also acquire market power
in the tied product. Id. at 38.
277. Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988). Justice
Scalia's opinion in this vertical restrictions/dealer termination case, resounding of
Chicago school economic theory and quoting extensively from Sylvania, made clear
that there was as yet no refinement to the Sylvania approach, instead stating "that
rules in this area [of vertical restraints] should be formulated with a view towards
protecting the doctrine of GTE Sylvania." Id. at 726.
278. Kevin J. Arquit, Market Power in Vertical Cases, 60 ANTITRUsT L.J. 921
(1991).
279. Id. at 921. Writing in 1991, George Hay, Professor of Law and Economics at
Cornell Law School remarked that "[i]n implementing the Court':; instructions to
evaluate nonprice restraints under the rule of reason, lower courts have generally
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opinion generally fall into four categories, namely: (1) misapplication
of the balancing test; (2) disregard for the real value and effect of
intrabrand competition; (3) uncertainty regarding the role of market
power in the vertical restraints context; and (4) the artificial
distinction between price and non-price vertical restraints.
a. Misapplication of the Balancing Test: Rule of Reason = Per
Se Legal?
It is inherently difficult, if not impossible, to measure the net
impact of harm to consumers caused by diminution in intrabrand
competition offset by benefits of increased interbrand competition.
As a result, "[flower courts have struggled with the language of
Sylvania," and, thus, typically opt to truncate their inquiry when
conducting a rule of reason "balancing" of vertical restraints. In such
cases, the courts simply determine whether the restraint enhances
interbrand competition.' As a consequence, a vertical restraint
challenge is practically always a "bye" for the defendant, or as
phrased succinctly by Judge Douglas Ginsburg, "with few exceptions,
defendants win under Sylvania."' One Third Circuit judge observed
tended to avoid the possible confusion about the trade-offs between intrabrand and
interbrand competition by fashioning a presumption that nonprice restraints are
procompetitive where the manufacturer does not have market power." George A.
Hay, Observations. Sylvania in Retrospect, 60 ANrITRUST LI. 61,62 (1991).
280. Arquit, supra note 278, at 921 ("A more easily measurable standard-and the
one that appears to be most often adopted by the courts as a practical matter-
focuses on the single question whether a restraint promotes an increase in interbrand
competition."). In his article examining how the federal courts of appeals apply the
Sylvania-dictated rule of reason analysis to nonprice vertical restraints cases, Judge
Ginsburg determined that there were basically four different approaches applied by
the courts, none of which adhered to Sylvania's albeit unclear parameters. According
to Judge Ginsburg:
One approach is to use a market power screen: no power, no foul.... A
second approach is to accept a plausible story that the vertical restraint may
provide some gain in interbrand competition, and to hold that sufficient to
outweigh any harm the restraint might do to intrabrand competition. ... A
third approach is for the court to concern itself only with whether the
vertical restraint poses a threat to interbrand competition ... [and in] the
fourth approach the court purports to balance the various effects of the
vertical restraint.
Ginsburg, supra note 274, at 74-75.
281. Ginsburg, supra note 274, at 6S. Judge Ginsburg announced, "I conclude that
non-monopolists have been effectively freed from antitrust regulation of vertical
nonprice restraints." Id. at 67; see also Gelhorn & Tatham, supra note 258, at 170
("The Court also failed to acknowledge that applying the rule of reason has generally
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that because the balancing test as currently applied is anything but
balanced, any business justification proffered by the defendant will
trump plaintiff's claim.' In a 1991 survey of non..price vertical
restraint cases before federal courts of appeals, Judge Ginsburg
discovered that well over ninety percent of the cases were won by
defendants.' In fact, it is only when the defendant is a monopolist
that the plaintiff has a chance of prevailing.' Given the carte blanche
enjoyed by most defendants regarding vertical non-pice restraints,
two questions become inescapable: (1) in response to widespread
dissatisfaction with the deficiencies of the current approach, will
courts and antitrust enforcement agencies depart from this de facto
per se legality approach to non-price vertical restraints, and if so, on
what grounds; and (2) if not, will there be formal recognition of the
current practice of per se legality, at least in the non-monopolistic
setting?
b. The Real Value and Effect of Intrabrand Competition
As discussed above, following the lead of Sylvania and its
progeny, courts almost unanimously uphold non-price vertical
restrictions that may impair or even eliminate intrabrand
competition.' Many critics rail that this is due, in large part, to an
meant that the defendant is exonerated.")
282. Carol Los Mansmann, The Impact of GTE Sylvania on Third Circuit
Jurisprudence, 60 ANnTRUST L.J. 83, 91 (1991); see also Perry S. Golischein, Vertical
Nonprice Restraints and the Mail-Order Industry: 30% Higher Prices Without
Intrabrand Competition (pts. 1 & 2), AIN'TRusT L. & ECON. REv., 1993, at 69,
ANTrrRusT L. & ECON. REv., 1994, at 67 (strongly critical of the free-rider
justification for upholding vertical restrictions curtailing or eliminating intrabrand
competition, such as mail-order prohibitions).
283. Ginsburg, supra note 274, at 71. Judge Ginsburg indicated thrt this figure was
undoubtedly underestimated due to strict case screening for the survey, which
excluded all cases involving issues analytically distinct from those addressed directly
by the Sylvania Court. I. at 71, 76; Arquit, supra note 278, at 922 (reporting on a
similar survey that confirmed the pro-defendant bias in non-price Nertical restraint
cases. "Von Kalinowski's exhaustive survey of the case law discloses that since
Sylvania only two plaintiffs have prevailed at the appellate court level in a territorial
or customer restraint case." (incomplete citation omitted)).
284. Ginsburg, supra note 274, at 71-73. Ginsburg noted that out of the four cases
in which plaintiffs prevailed, two involved virtual monopolists, one concerned an
unusual "hybrid" restriction incorporating a dual distributorship and a horizontal
relationship and the fourth, Eiberger v. Sony Corp. of America, 622 F.2d 1068 (2d Cir.
1980), is referred to by many as aberrational.
285. Among which number leading cases such as Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv.
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economically erroneous dismissal of the value of intrabrand
competition to consumer welfare launched by Sylvania." " Indeed,
there is insinuation in Sylvania that intrabrand competition can be
somehow undesirable, or at least irrelevant, from a consumer welfare
point of view:
The degree of intrabrand competition is wholly independent of the
level of interbrand competition confronting the manufacturers.
Thus, there may be fierce intrabrand competition among the
distributors of a product produced by a monopolist and no
intrabrand competition among the distributors of a product
produced by a firm in a highly competitive industry. But when
interbrand competition exists, as it does among television
manufacturers, it provides a significant check on the exploitation of
intrabrand market power because of the ability of consumers to
substitute a different brand of the same product.: 7
Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984) and Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 4S5 U.S.
717 (198S).
286. See e.g., William S. Comanor, The Two Economics of Vertical Restraints, 21
Sw. U. L. REv. 1265 (1992); Goldschein, supra note 282; Grimes, supra note 248;
Hay, supra note 279; W.F. Mueller, The End of Chicago's Free Ride on Scaly: The
Free-Rider Theory Meets the Facts of Life, ANTIrTRUST L. & ECoN. REv., 198, at 17;
Robert L. Steiner, The Inverse Association Between the Margins of Manqjfcturers
and Retailers, 8 REv. INDUS. ORG. 717 (1993); Robert L. Steiner, Intrabrand
Competition-Stepchild of Antitrust, 36 ANTITRUST BULL 155 (1991); Robert L.
Steiner, Sylvania Economics-A Critique, 60 ANTITRUST LJ. 41 (1991); Robert L.
Steiner, The Nature of Vertical Restraints, 30 ANTITRUST BULL. 143 (1985). The
Court became further entrenched in its anti-intrabrand bias in Sharp, 485 U.S. 717.
287. Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 n.19 (emphasis
added). Notice the inherent contradiction in the first and last sentences of this quote.
Compare Robert L. Steiner's evaluation of the Court's (seemingly) ambivalent
rationale for dismissing the value of intrabrand competition:
The Sylvania Court in a remarkable two-page summary acknowledged the
existence of all three possible relationships between these two processes.
First, the Court lays out that vertical restraints have the potential for
simultaneously reducing intrabrand and stimulating interbrand competition,
which implies a negative correlation between the variables. It then proceeds
to state 'The degree of intrabrand competition is wholly independent of the
level of interbrand competition.' In the very same note we are told that the
existence of lively interbrand competition limits intrabrand market power,
implying a positive relationship between the two processes. Though begging
for further analysis and for hard evidence in support of its taxonomy, the
Court's seemingly contradictory summary turns out to be realistic.
Steiner, Intrabrand Competition-Stepchild of Antitrust, supra note 286, at 158. In
this detailed and insightful analysis of the relationship between intra- and inter-brand
competition in different industries, Steiner persuasively concludes that, within
different industry structures, the relationship can be negative, positive or "essentially
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Except for the statement that "[e]conomists also have argued
that manufacturers have an economic interest in maintaining as much
intrabrand competition as is consistent with the efficient distribution
of their products,"' ' there is no discussion in Sylvania of the potential
direct benefits to consumers of strong intrabrand competition, despite
the fact that the Court was willing to trade off intrabrand competition
for the sake of fostering interbrand competition. The Court in Sharp,
quoting extensively from Sylvania, only fortified its negative stance
toward intrabrand competition and further emphasized the
prevention of free-riding as a crucial justification for vertical non-
price restraints.' In retrospect, it appears rather amiss Ihat the Court
was continuously willing to condone foreclosing intrabrand
competition without actually examining what was at stake.2')
This cursory dismissal seems all the more unfortunate since, as
argued persuasively by many experts, "intrabrand competition among
distributors and/or retailers competing for sales of the same brand is
at least as important as interbrand competition" in achieving
competitive advantages for consumers. In fact, critics maintain that it
is intrabrand, and not interbrand, competition that is primarily
responsible for reducing costs and bridling markups in distribution.!"1
According to Robert Steiner the conclusion that "intrabrand
competition is a vital contributor to economic efficiency in consumer
goods industries... is a conclusion that stands in sharp contrast to
[the] Chicago doctrine" which so permeates the Supreme Court's
uncorrelated"; however, this clearly was not the Supreme Court's intended message
behind footnote 19 nor have the lower courts so interpreted it. Id. at 177-78.
288. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 56 (relying on the Chicago School, citing Robert Bork,
The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division (I), 75
YALE L.J. 373, 403 (1966) and Richard Posner, Antitrust Policy aad the Supreme
Court: An Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential
Competition Decisions, 75 COLUtr. L. REv. 282 (1975)).
289. Sharp, 485 U.S. at 728 ("vertical nonprice restraints only accomplish the
benefits identified in GTE Sylvania because they reduce intrabrand price competition
to the point where the dealer's profit margin permits provision of the desired
services.").
290. Robert Steiner, in his article Intrabrand Competition-Stepchild of Antitrust,
supra note 286, discusses six "widely accepted propositions" that have been decisive
in the Supreme Court's position on vertical restraints. Steiner cogently demonstrates
why each of these six premises is either wholly or partially wrong, and thus suggests
the need for "building a sounder understanding of real-world econorrdc relationships
in consumer goods industries." Id. at 159.
291. Goldschein, supra note 282, at 75; see also Steiner, Sylvania Economics-A
Critique, supra note 286, at 157.
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decisions in Sylvania and, arguably, Sharp.
The fundamental flaw in the Chicago approach, however, arises
from reliance on a single-stage economic model that assumes
downstream markets that are "inert and almost perfectly
competitive." By focusing on the manufacturing segment and
completely omitting the retail or distribution segment "where
intrabrand competition makes its greatest contribution,' the
Chicago doctrine ignores the benefits of intrabrand competition. One
well-documented example, that of the Sealy cases, demonstrates the
potential for consumer benefit inherent in intrabrand competition.
Prior to 1967, franchisor Sealy, Inc. implemented franchisee licenses
containing strict territorial restrictions and naked factory and retail
price limits. In 1967, the Supreme Court condemned the price fixing
aspects of the license as per se illegal,':7 and in 1980, a final decision in
another case resulted in the elimination of the remaining restrictions
comprising the territorial limitations.' The national impact of the
intense intrabrand competition that flourished following the removal
of the vertical restraints is remarkable. The Sealy figures for 19S1-
1984 reveal the following:
(a) Sealy sales increased by some 50%, the largest increase in its
history; (b) its profits rose by some 100%; (c) Sealy's market share
rose by some 43% (from 19.4% of the national mattress market to
27.7%); and (d) the price of mattresses to the consumer, in the
areas where this Sealy intrabrand competition developed, fell by
292. Steiner, Intrabrand Competition-Stepchild of Antitrust, supra note 286, at
159, 195-200 ("It is simply not possible to investigate the causes and consequences of
vertical restraints, among many other antitrust problems, within the single-stage
framework."); see also Goldschein, supra note 282, at 75-76. Warren Grimes, in
supporting his contention that intrabrand competition "disciplines any downstream
market power associated with brand merchandising" divides economic theories
regarding vertical restraints into four categories:
Theorists sympathetic to vertical restraints tend to focus on arguments in the
first two categories: (1) that vertical restraints create valuable incentives for
promotion; and (2) that vertical restraints are an important tool for saving
transactional costs. Theorists less sympathetic to the use of vertical
restraints tend to focus on the second two categories: (3) that vertical
restraints tend to facilitate collusive or cartel behavior; and (4) that vertical
restraints undercut the allocative and dynamic benefits of downstream
intrabrand competition.
Grimes, supra note 248, at 86.
293. United States v. Scaly, Inc., 38S U.S. 350 (1967).
294. Ohio-Scaly v. Scaly, Inc., 585 F.2d 821 (7th Cir. 1978); see Mueller, supra note
286, at 17.
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some 20% to 30%, with the competing interbrand sellers-
Simmons, Serta and so on-being forced to lower theirs in order to
meet the reduced prices generated by this competition among Sealy
licensees as they moved into each other's territories.25
A leading economic expert, William Mueller, estimated that for
the year 1984 alone, Sealy's removal of vertical restrictions created a
$116.3 million increase in consumer surplus, as well as a $32.3 million
gain in social welfare, figures that do not include the benefit of
horizontal competitor price decreases from heightened interbrand
competition.2 6
c. The Free-Rider Myth: Biased Justification for Eliminating
Intrabrand Competition
One element of the Chicago-based anti-intrabrand competition
bias adopted by Sylvania and its progeny is the free-rider theory. The
free-rider theory warrants particular notice because it is often raised
as a justification for upholding vertical restraints." According to the
Chicago school, discount dealers can charge lower prices and attract
customers because they "free ride" on services provided by full price
retailers, such as service and repair facilities, promotional activities or
other informational services.2" Sylvania further explained that "[t]he
availability and quality of such services affect a manufacturer's
goodwill and the competitiveness of his product." In reality, without
the protection of vertical restrictions, retailers in a purely competitive
295. Steiner, Intrabrand Competition-Stepchild of Antitrust, supra note 286, at
189 (citing Mueller, supra note 286).
296. Mueller, supra note 286, at 34-35; see also Goldschein, supra note 282, at 70-
71, (summarizing the Levi Strauss jeans case and the $261 million in consumer
savings for 1977-1978 resulting from removal of vertical price fixing restrictions on
distributors).
297. See, e.g., M. Laurence Popofsky & Mark S. Popofsky, Vertical Restraints in the
1990s: Is There a 'Thermidorian Reaction' to the Post-Sylvania Orthodoxy?, 62
ANTrrRUST L.J. 729, 731 (1994) ("In particular, courts and scholars alike have
emphasized how distribution restraints can alleviate the 'free rider' problems that are
created when dealers offer pre-sale services that benefit their competitors."),
298. See, e.g., Continental TV., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 55 (1977).
See also Bork, supra note 288; Posner, supra note 288; Posner, The Chicago School of
Antitrust Analysis, supra note 258. Cf. Symposium, Post-Chicago Economics:
Editor's Note, 63 ANTRUST L.J. 445, 445 (1995) ("Post-Chicago thinkers have set
out to prove that the Chicago School's simplified economic models are of limited
usefulness in understanding the complex economic forces that operate in the real
world.").
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situation would not provide such services.2" According to the theory,
social welfare is therefore improved by providing such services.
Unfortunately, neither Sylvania, its descendants nor antitrust
enforcement agencies questioned whether rampant free-riding is a
realistic problem besetting the marketplace.r  The S'lvania
viewpoint also fails to raise or address the possibility that a discount
distributor is simply more efficient than other distributors."' No
theory has been advanced that consumers may not always want the
increased services and promotional expenses. Consumers may, in
many cases, simply prefer lower prices. Therefore, because courts
rarely, if ever, engage in a true rule of reason balancing when
confronted with a vertical restraints challenge, prevention of free-
riding has become the magic defense, enabling defendants to almost
always win, regardless of their true motivation in imposing such
restraints?30
B. The EU Commission's Green Paper on Vertical Restraints
Spearheaded by the EC Commission, antitrust authorities in the
EU are currently grappling with the issue of vertical restraints in
licensing and distribution contracts. The impetus behind intellectual
debate regarding the benefits and drawbacks of vertical restraints
stems from a desire to implement the EU's goal of a true economic
single market. As stated by the Commission:
The 1992 programme was the result of a widely held conviction that
the failure to achieve a single market has been costing European
299. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 55.
300. See, e.g., Goldschein, supra note 282, at 77 (pt. 1) ("[Goldschein] has not
found any studies documenting the proliferation of free riding. Nor are any of the
claims by other commentators that free riding is common phenomenon substantiated
by any studies."); Goldschein, supra note 282, at 68 (pt. 2); see also Steiner, Sylvania
Economics-A Critique, supra note 286, at 48.
301. This is especially likely when the discount distributor employs new and more
efficient methods of distribution, such as mail order sales. In his two-part article,
Goldschein vigorously dispels the free rider myth, particularly in the context of mail
order sales. Goldschein, supra note 282 (pts. 1 & 2).
302. Id at 68-75. The real motivation for implementing vertical restrictions that
reduce or eliminate intrabrand competition may be to appease a full-price retailer or
even in some cases to hide a price fixing agreement or to maintain higher retail profit
margins enabling the producer to share in those margins. See, e.g., Grimes, supra
note 248, at 100-06 ("Thus, judicial recognition of the argument notwithstanding,
most vertical restraints cannot be justified as a tool for eliminating free riding by
nonperforming dealers.").
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industry millions in unnecessary costs and lost opportunities ....
Now that more steps have been taken to eliminate the remaining
obstacles to the free movement of goods, services, and factors of
production, it is still apparent that further efforts are necessary to
achieve the maximum possible level of integration.1
Despite a degree of price convergence within the Member States,
considerable economic advantage still can be gained from further
market integration. The potential of private agreements, such as
vertical restraints, to hinder or facilitate market inlegration has
underscored the need for sufficiently flexible EU policy and
legislation.
In response to concerns over vertical restraints, the Commission
finally issued the long-awaited Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in
EU Competition Policy (the Green Paper).' Recognizdng the high
costs and risks associated with penetrating new markets and the
increasing importance of consumer benefit of pre- and post-sales
support, the Commission acknowledged that the potentially positive
competitive effects of vertical contract obligations between producers
and distributors cannot be ignored. Equally apparent, however, is the
fact that "arrangements between producers and distributors can also
be used to continue the partitioning of the [EU] market and exclude
new entrants who would intensify competition and lead to downward
pressure on prices."3"5
In response to what has been described as an emerging consensus
that non-price vertical restraints are neither per se suspicious nor per
se procompetitive, the Commission conducted a series of interviews
with manufacturers, retailers, industry trade and consumer
associations and academics. The Commission did this to develop a
picture of current types of distribution systems within the EU, the
nature and scope of vertical restraints used and the impact of current
legislation on these agreements. Acknowledging that full integration
into a single market has yet to be achieved, the Green Paper
examines the economic impact of vertical restraints.
303. The European Commission, Green Paper on Vertical Restraints in EC
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1. Summary of Current Distribution Practices Within the EU
According to the Green Paper, in the early 1990s, approximately
4.5 million enterprises employing almost twenty-two million people
were involved in the process or function of distributing goods within
the EU3' Of these enterprises, 3.4 million were at the retail level,
while at least 1.1 million entities performed wholesale functions.-7
With respect to wholesalers, the recent trend is towards greater
concentration and elimination of the intermediary between the
producer and the retailer. Typically, the retail chain itself will assume
the functions of the wholesaler. This pressure induced some
wholesalers to offer additional services to the retailers, including high
tech stock control, full-scale retail outlet set ups, advertising and
promotions and even financial services.."  In addition, many
wholesalers reformatted the structure of their operations. For
example, they may act as the central buying power and/or service
provider for a group of small retailers. Some wholesalers have
diversified into the retail operations arena, whereas others may
function as "cash and carry" warehouses, allowing retailers to collate
and transport their own goods.
Retailers have also become more concentrated into large retail
outfits, which account for over fifty percent of sales in Northern
Europe.310 Review of current practices reveals that retailers are very
concerned about having more precise control over the chain of
supply. For example, current practices indicate a definite trend
within the EU towards the use of a central supply depot, which
receives shipments from various suppliers. Goods are then
redistributed to individual retail outlets, often by independent
contractors.
The driving force behind recent trends in distribution is the
introduction of advanced information technology within the
distribution sector. It is interesting to note the degree of international
coordination, evidenced by the acceptance of universal standards,




309. Id. I 22,23.
310. Id. 30. In Southern Europe, however, smaller independent retailers are still
predominant. Id.
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is made to the acceptance of universal bar code standards, which
permits the development of scanning technology. Also cited are
application technologies, such as electronic funds transfers at the
point of sale and electronic data interchange." Technological
advancements in this area resulted in direct contact between retailers,
manufacturers, suppliers and distributors, ultimately leading to more
efficient supply management at all levels of the distribution chain.
One clear example of change spawned by information
technology advances is the shift to Just In Time (JIT) manufacturing,
where items are not produced until rapid transmission of electronic
information indicates that there is a consumer request for them.
Under a JIT system, therefore, large stock inventories are neither
necessary nor desirable. The Green Paper outlines the economic
advantages of the JIT approach, such as reductions in stock holding
costs and the elimination of inefficiencies in production."1 From a
competition law standpoint, such advances in information technology
are causing an appreciable and, it would seem, inevitable shift
towards a more cooperative relationship among different levels of the
distribution chain.313
2. Summary of Economic Analysis of Vertical Restraints in the
EU
Reflecting the input of ongoing economic debate within both the
EU and the United States, the Commission now emphasizes the
importance of evaluating market structure when assessing the impact
of vertical restraints. The degree of interbrand competition is now
considered a "crucial" element determinative of the net effect of
particular vertical restraints on competition.314 A distinction must be
made between situations in which vertical restraints have an
"unambiguously positive effect" and those in which negative
311. Id. 135.
312. Id. 41. Also discussed are the Quick Response logistics system, described as
a refinement of the JIT system, and the Efficient Consumer Response system. Id. 1
42.
313. Here, the Commission refers to the example of the Proctor & Gamble (P&G)
and Wal-Mart alliance, whereby the manufacturer P&G receives information directly
from the check-out scanners at Wal-Mart, allowing P&G to match its production to
Wal-Mart's demand. Id. 43. While such manufacturer/retailer integration may still
be in its incipiency in the EU, common implementation of such relationships does not
appear to be far behind.
314. Id. 1 65.
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ramifications are highly likely.
One example of the positive effects of vertical restraints cited by
the Commission is vertical coordination of pricing, which can
eliminate the problem of "double marginalization" that occurs when
successive entities of a distribution chain add additional profit margin
to the cost of an item as it makes its way from producer to
consumer.315  In this situation, maximum retail price setting by
manufacturers, or even minimum purchase requirements, can benefit
consumers directly and benefit downstream entities in the distribution
chain, which could ultimately benefit consumers. The Commission
also addressed the highly charged issue of free-riding. It recognized
that vertical restrictions, such as exclusive territories, may solve the
problem of non-participating retailers free-riding on the pre-sale
efforts of those already within a market by providing promotional
and/or technical information services to customers.' Additional
services may also include post-sale services such as guarantees and
maintenance.
Conversely, according to the Commission, there are at least three
different ways that vertical restrictions can have a deleterious impact
on competition. For example, blatantly prohibited practices, such as
resale price maintenance or absolute territorial restrictions, may serve
the collusive ends of illegal manufacturing or distribution cartels by
reducing or eliminating intrabrand competition:
[D]istributors may be interested in the enforcement of agreements
with their suppliers to restrict competition at the retailers' level.
When distributors have market power, this interest is particularly
likely to emerge if entry in distribution is difficult. Vertical
restraints can also be used to help enforce collusive price
agreements between manufacturers. For instance, resale price
maintenance can facilitate collusion as price cuts at the retail level
are easier to detect. If all multibrand retailers maintain the prices
established by the producers, cartel-breaking cuts in wholesale
prices could not be reflected at the retail level without a risk of
being rapidly detected. The impossibility of passing on those cuts
and the risk of retaliation by other cartel members make cartel
agreements more stable in the presence of retail price maintenance
315. Id. 57.
316. Id. 59.
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[agreements]. 317
Secondly, vertical restrictions such as exclusive distribution
agreements coupled with limited numbers of retailers also may have a
negative impact on competition by foreclosing or hindering entry into
the market of potentially more efficient competing manufacturers.
However, as seen above in the discussion regarding block exemptions,
some vertical restrictions such as territorial exclusivity provisions may
also promote competition.18 Finally, the Commission recognizes that
within an oligopolistic market, vertical restraints can diminish
competition both by reducing intrabrand competition as well as
inhibiting interbrand competition."9 Assimilating the current wisdom,
the Commission reached the following conclusions based on its recent
economic analysis of vertical restraints conducted prior to drafting the
Green Paper:
I. Anti-competitive effects of vertical restraints are likely to
be insignificant in competitive markets. Rather their
efficiency enhancing effect and benefit to consumers is
likely to dominate. Anti-competitive effects are only likely
where interbrand competition is weak and there are
barriers to entry.
II. Individual clauses or different types of vertical restraints
cannot be considered per se as having a negative or
positive effect on competition or integration.
III. The combination of several vertical restraints does not
necessarily increase any anti-competitive effects but may,
in fact, make the outcome more favourable.
IV. Analysis should concentrate on the impact on the market,
rather than the form of the agreements, for example
whether entry is foreclosed by a network of agreements or
317. Id. 61.
318. See supra notes 90-142 and accompanying text.
319. It is worthwhile to note that, in the words of the Commission, "[tihe addition
of vertical restraints does not necessarily imply a proportional worsening of their
impact on competition." Green Paper, supra note 303, 67. By way of example, the
use of a territorial restriction in response to a free-rider problem may have the effect
of dampening intrabrand competition, thereby causing price increases. The
territorial restriction may also exacerbate double marginalization problems. By
coupling the territorial restriction with a price ceiling or two-ti.red tariff, the
combination of vertical restraints will in fact have a positive impact on competition.
Id.
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whether the vertical agreement coupled with market power
permits producers or distributors to practice price
discrimination between different Member States.
V. Given the risks associated either with entry into new
markets or significant market expansions (i.e. creation of
new trade flows that integrate the market) consideration
should be given to a more favourable treatment towards
vertical restraints where this accompanied by significant
material or immaterial investment. This more favourable
treatment should be limited in time.
VI. The nature of the products, the need for services and
investment to undertake efficient distribution and the
needs and knowledge of consumers may all be important
elements in determining both the objective efficiencies
promoted by vertical restraints and any anti-competitive
effects " '
The above conclusions reveal yet another conclusion repeated
throughout the Green Paper, namely that vertical restraints out of
context cannot be rigidly categorized as either per se anticompetitive
or procompetitive. Rather, the effects of vertical restraints are
relative to the structure of the particular market at issue. Vertical
restraints, therefore, can be instrumental in integrating markets, yet
they also can be used to erect artificial barriers to inhibit such
integration. This fundamental consideration must be taken into
account as the Commission endeavors to update both the policy and
legislation concerning vertical restraints.
3. Summary of Current EU Vertical Restraints Legislation
In addition to the Technology Transfer Block Exemption
examined in detail above, the Commission issued three block
exemptions that relate specifically to vertical restraints. Replacing an
earlier version passed in 1967, the Commission issued Regulation
1983/83 covering exclusive distributorships and Regulation 1984/83
concerning exclusive purchasing agreements.'" The Commission later
320. Id. 85.
321. Commission Regulation 1983183 of 22 June 1983 on the Application of
Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Exclusive Distribution Agreements, 1983
O.J. (L 173) 1; Commission Regulation 1984183 of 22 June 1983 on the Application of
Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Exclusive Purchasing Agreements, 19S3
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issued Regulation 4087/88 covering franchising agreements.
Another recognized form of distribution is selective distribution
under which distributors are chosen based on objective criteria
deemed necessary for the efficient distribution of the particular
goods. As selective distribution was not perceived to be unduly
restrictive of competition, this type of agreement is covered by means
of individual Commission decisions.
All three block exemptions follow the basic block exemption
structure: an exhaustive "White List" of restrictive clauses that are
exempted from article 85(1) under article 85(3); a non-exhaustive
"Grey List" of other obligations that are normally not restrictive of
competition and therefore may be included in an exempted contract
(excepting the franchising block exemption); and a non-exhaustive
"Black List" of obligations deemed anticompetitive and which will
disqualify an agreement from exemption. The franchising block
exemption also contains a provision for a non-opposition procedure
to be utilized in the case of obligations that would normally be on the
"Grey List," in other words, those that are neither exempted nor
expressly forbidden.'
Regulation 1983/83 pertains to bilateral exclusive distribution
agreements concerning finished goods for resale in the cross-border
context. Part of the rationale behind Regulation 1983/83 is that such
agreements "facilitate the promotion of sales of a product and lead to
intensive marketing and to continuity of supplies while at the same
time rationalizing distribution," and moreover, they "stimulate
competition between the products of different manufacturers."'' 4 The
supplier may agree to provide goods for resale within the designated
territory solely to the exclusive distributor and not to distribute goods
O.J. (L 173) 5. The exclusive purchasing block exemption also contains specific
provisions pertaining to beer and petrol.
322. Commission Regulation 4087/88 of 30 November 1988 on the Application of
Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Categories of Franchising Agreements, 1988 O.J. (L
359) 46.
323. Id. at art. 6(6). If the Commission does not oppose an agreement within six
months of receiving a complete notification, then the agreement is deemed
exempted. The Commission noted that, in 1995, the opposition procedure under the
franchising block exemption was used only twice and therefore requested comments
on why this procedure is not availed of more frequently. Green Paper, supra note
303, 1 103.
324. Commission Regulation 1983183,supra note 321, at recitals 5-7.
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to other dealers or directly to consumers within the territory.'
However, the supplier may sell to a customer within the exclusive
territory only if the customer requests the sale, the goods are
delivered outside the territory and the selling supplier pays the
transportation costs.! 6 The distributor may be required to obtain the
contract goods only from the supplier, and the distributor also may be
prohibited from manufacturing or distributing competing goods" or
from actively seeking sales outside the designated territory."
Obligations to purchase complete lines of goods or minimum
quantities, to sell under a trademark or in certain packaging,
advertise, maintain a sales network or stock of goods, provide
customer and guarantee services and employ technically trained
personnel are also permitted provisions."
Regulation 1984193, which applies only to exclusive purchasing
agreements concerning goods for resale, is for the most part similar to
Regulation 1983/83. However, under Regulation 1984/83, the
supplier cannot place restrictions on the dealer's territory."
Conversely, the supplier cannot be prevented from making direct
sales to consumers within the dealer's principal sales area, restricted
from appointing other dealers within that area or be prohibited from
operating on a different level of distribution within that area." '
Reference should be made to Regulation 4087/88 for specific
exemptions and prohibitions of vertical restrictions in the franchising
context. As reiterated by the Commission in the Green Paper, the
various block exemptions demonstrate paramount consideration for
safeguarding the possibility of parallel trade, and that will continue to
be a fundamental aspect of new legislation."
325. Id. at arts. 1, 2(1).
326. Commission Notice Concerning Regulations 1983183 EEC and 1984!83 EEC
of 22 June 1983 on the Application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to Categories of
Exclusive Distribution Agreements and Exclusive Purchasing Agreements, 1983 OJ.
(C 355) 7, TT 27, 30.
327. Commission Regulation 1983183, supra note 321, at art. 2(2)(a)-(b).
However, unlike the earlier block exemption, this non-compete prohibition may not
be extended beyond the expiry of the exclusive distribution agreement.
328. Id. at art.2(2)(c).
329. Id. at art. 2(3).
330. Commission Regulation 1984183, supra note 321, at art. 16.
331. Id. at art. 2(1), (3)(b). However, it is permissible to restrict the supplier from
selling goods at the dealer's level within the dealer's principal sales area.
332. Green Paper, supra note 303, $ 21,23.
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4. Options for Improved Legislation Governing Vertical
Restraints
In publishing the Green Paper, the Commission outlined a
structure for dialogue within the business, legal, academic and
governmental communities to facilitate the revision of the rules
governing vertical restrictions. The Green Paper, in turn, examined
the current state of distribution systems within the EU, the latest
economic theory concerning the competitive effects of vertical
restraints on the goal of further integration to a single market, as well
as the current procedures, institutional framework and laws
pertaining to vertical restraints. The current overall EU approach is
then compared with that of third countries, including the United
States. While emphasizing the Commission is unique in that "it is the
only competition enforcement agency in the world that has a market
integration objective in addition to that of maintaining a system of
undistorted competition,"'333 there is nonetheless a sense that the
Commission is quite open to drawing upon the experiences of other
regimes as it improves vertical restraint legislation and policy.
The Commission proposed four alternative legislative and policy
provisions distilled from many sources, and all comments on the
alternatives were submitted by July 3, 1997. It is noted, however, that
these options are not exhaustive, and particular elements from the
different options may be combined in a different proposal. The
Commission further indicated that any option should be considered in
light of the following points:
(1) While the Commission acknowledges that the case law of the
Community Courts and its own policy regarding vertical
restraints evolved over time and are likely to continue to do
so, it envisages only options that remain within Ihe bounds of
article 85 as interpreted by the European Courts.
(2) Absolute territorial protection and Resale Price Maintenance
that may affect trade between Member States will not only
continue to be per se under article 85(1), but they are
unlikely to be exempted.
(3) The options apply only to vertical distribution agreements
and not agreements between competitors, although the latter
may be permitted for certain Small- and Medium-Sized
333. Id. 30.
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Entities.
(4) The options apply principally to vertical arrangements for
resale goods. Comments are requested on whether the
options can be extended to intermediate goods.
(5) Non-opposition procedures are not an appropriate solution
for dealing with a large number of cases.
(6) Comments are requested on the use of market share
thresholds either to define eligibility for exemption or as a
guide to market structures when the Commission may
withdraw the benefit of this exemption.
(7) A separate exercise is currently under way to increase the
thresholds below which article 85(1) does not apply (Notice
on Agreements of Minor Importance-de minimis). As a
working hypothesis for this exercise, this may be taken to be
ten percent.
The four options, respectively, are Option I-Maintain the
Current System; Option 11-Wider Block Exemptions; Option III-
More Focused Block Exemptions; and Option IV-Reduce the Scope
of Article 85(1). The Commission suggests that the current system be
made more flexible than Option H-Wider Block Exemptions, for
example, by increasing application to agreements between more than
two parties, permitting clauses that are similar or less restrictive than
the exhaustive list of exempted clauses or allowing severance of an
objectionable clause from the main agreement rather than rendering
that agreement null and void. ' It is also suggested that the block
exemptions be extended to services, including product processing or
transformation by distributors, or that the Exclusive Purchasing Block
Exemption be extended to cover partial, as well as exclusive, supply.
Option In-More Focused Block Exemptions centers on
fostering intrabrand competition under circumstances of limited
interbrand competition. Emphasizing that, in the presence of market
power, territorial and other vertical restrictions are major factors in
maintaining significant price differentials among Member States, the
Commission proposes to limit application of the vertical restraints
block exemptions to agreements between parties who each have less
than a forty percent market share in the relevant markets."
334. Id. 281.
335. Id. 285-86.
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Drawbacks to this approach, such as certainty in defining markets and
gauging market share, are acknowledged.' z
Option IV-Reduce the Scope of Article 85(1) envisions creating
more legal certainty by employing a rebuttable presumption, "the
negative clearance presumption," that agreements between parties
with less than a certain market share within the contract territory
(twenty percent is suggested) are presumed compatible with article
85(1). Thus, vertical restraints between such parties would not be
caught by article 85(1). An exception is made for the per se illegal
provisions, such as resale price maintenance, parallel trade obstacles
or distribution agreements between competitors.37
IV. Conclusion
It is important that the United States and the EU continue on
their paths of cooperation in the area of antitrust enforcement. Both
systems can learn from the other, and with ever-increasing economic
globalization, it can be argued that the United States and EU must act
in a manner that permits and encourages economic efficiency and
effectiveness. Systems that run contrary to each other will stifle
efficiency and the free market. In fact, the United States and EU
should encourage worldwide cooperation in order to assist global
companies in successfully competing worldwide.
336. Id. 289-91.
337. Id. 294.
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